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CONVERGENCE OF LARGE POPULATION GAMES TO MEAN FIELD GAMES WITH
INTERACTION THROUGH THE CONTROLS
MATHIEU LAURIE`RE & LUDOVIC TANGPI
Abstract. This work considers stochastic differential games with a large number of players, whose costs and
dynamics interact through the empirical distribution of both their states and their controls. We develop a frame-
work to prove convergence of finite-player games to the asymptotic mean field game. Our approach is based on
the concept of propagation of chaos for forward and backward weakly interacting particles which we investigate
by fully probabilistic methods, and which appear to be of independent interest. These propagation of chaos
arguments allow to derive moment and concentration bounds for the convergence of both Nash equilibria and
social optima in non-cooperative and cooperative games, respectively. Incidentally, we also obtain convergence of
a system of second order parabolic partial differential equations on finite dimensional spaces to a second order
parabolic partial differential equation on the Wasserstein space.
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1. Introduction
The motivation behind this paper is to present a systematic method to investigate the asymptotic behavior
of a class of symmetric N -player stochastic differential games in continuous time as the number of players N
becomes large. To be more precise, let us briefly describe such a game in the non-cooperative case. We consider
a game in which each player (or agent) i ∈ {1, . . . , N} controls a diffusion process X i,N whose evolution is given
by
dX i,Nt = b
t,X i,Nt , αi,Nt , 1N
N∑
j=1
δ(Xj,Nt ,α
j,N
t )
 dt+ σ dW it
for some independent Brownian motions W 1, . . . ,WN where αi,N is a control process chosen by player i and δx
is the Dirac delta mass at x. Agent i tries to minimize an individual cost
E
∫ T
0
f
t,X i,Nt , αi,Nt , 1N
N∑
j=1
δ(Xj,Nt ,α
j,N
t )
 dt+ g(X i,NT , 1N
N∑
j=1
δXj,N
T
) .
In this context, it is natural to investigate the concept of Nash equilibrium (αˆ1,N , . . . , αˆN,N). See Section 2.1 for
definitions and a more precise description of the model. Unfortunately, as the number of players becomes large,
the N -Nash equilibrium becomes analytically and (especially) numerically intractable. The groundbreaking idea
of Lasry & Lions [56] and Huang et al. [48] is to argue that, heuristically, for such a symmetric game, when N
goes to infinity, αˆi,N should converge to a so-called mean field equilibrium αˆ, which is defined as follows. For a
fixed (measurable) measure flow (ξt)t≥0, let (αˆ
ξ
t )t≥0 be a solution of the stochastic control probleminfα E
[ ∫ T
0
f(t,Xαt , αt, ξt) dt+ g(X
α
T , ξT )
]
dXαt = b(t,X
α
t , αt, ξt) dt+ σ dWt.
A flow of measures ξˆ is an equilibrium flow if it satisfies the consistency condition that the law of (X αˆ
ξˆ
t , αˆ
ξˆ
t )
equals ξˆt for every t ∈ [0, T ]; the associated control αˆ is an equilibrium control. The question at the heart of the
present paper is to know how far αˆ is from αˆi,N . In other terms, we are interested in an estimation of the “error”
|αˆi,N − αˆ|.
It is only after more than a decade of intensive research on mean field games that the intriguing heuristics
mentioned above have been put into rigorous mathematical ground and in satisfactory generality. Notably, the
works of Lacker [52] and Fischer [34] proved convergence results on the N -Nash equilibria to the mean field
equilibrium as N goes to infinity for open-loop controls. Using the a PDE on the Wasserstein space called the
master equation, Cardaliaguet et al. [15] proved convergence for closed-loop controls, even in the presence of
common noise. We also refer to works by Lacker [54], Delarue et al. [29, 30], Cardaliaguet [12] for more recent
progress on this convergence question. Anticipating our brief discussion of these papers in the soon-to-come
literature review (see § 1.2), let us mention at this point that with the exception of [29], none of the above
cited papers investigates non-asymptotic results, nor do their settings cover games with interactions through the
distribution of controls (or “control interactions” for short).
Games with control interactions, sometimes called “extended”, occur when the dynamics or the cost function
of player i may explicitly depend on the empirical measure of the controls of the other players, and not just on
their respective states. Such games were first introduced by Gomes et. al. [42] and their investigation quickly
picked-up momentum due to their relevance in various problems e.g. in economics and finance. References are
provided below (see § 1.2). One important aspect of our analysis will be to include the treatment of such games.
1.1. Main results: informal statements and method. The main result of this paper is to show that (even)
for games with interactions through the controls, under sufficient regularity and convexity assumptions on the
coefficients of the game one obtains a non-asymptotic estimate of the “error” term E[|αˆi,Nt −αˆt|2] and consequently
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convergence of αˆi,N to αˆ (for instance we show that in a linear-quadratic case, it holds E[|αˆi,Nt − αˆt|2] ≤ CN−1
for every N). This moment estimate is bolstered by concentration inequalities (some of which dimension-free)
notably bounding the probability that the Wasserstein distance between the empirical measure of the N -Nash
equilibrium and the law of the mean-field equilibrium exceeds a given threshold. The contribution of this article
is also methodological. In fact, we design a three-step approach to bound the error:
(i) Characterize the solution of the N -player game by a system of forward-backward stochastic differential
equations (FBSDE).
(ii) Investigate asymptotic properties of the system of equations, showing in particular that it converges to a
McKean-Vlasov FBSDE (see definition below).
(iii) Show that the limiting McKean-Vlasov FBSDE characterizes the mean field equilibrium.
En route to implementing the three steps of our program, we establish several results of independent interest. In
the first step, we prove a version of Pontryagin’s stochastic maximum principle for N -player stochastic differential
games with control interactions. As explained in the monograph of Carmona and Delarue [20], the maximum
principle is an essential step in the probabilistic analysis of stochastic differential games. To achieve step (ii), we
further develop the theory of backward propagation of chaos initiated by the authors in [57]. The idea here is that,
roughly speaking, the FBSDEs characterizing the N -player game can be interpreted (themselves) as a system of
weakly interacting particles evolving forward and backward in time. A substantial part of the article is devoted
to the investigation of non-asymptotic, strong propagation of chaos type results for such particle systems. At
the purely probabilistic level, these results extend the original ideas of Sznitman [64] introduced for interacting
(forward) particles to fully coupled systems of interacting forward and backward particles. Due to the independent
relevance of these convergence results, this part of the paper is presented in a self-contained manner and so that it
can be read separately. In fact, in this article, aside from the (non-cooperative) large population games discussed
so far, we illustrate applications of this “forward-backward propagation of chaos” in two ways. First, we consider
the convergence of the optimal control of N -player cooperative games to the solution of an associated McKean-
Vlasov control problem. In addition, we also use it to prove convergence of a system of second order parabolic
partial differential equations written on an Euclidean space to a so-called master equation, a second order PDE
written on the Wasserstein space. This allows for convergence results to PDEs on infinite dimensional spaces
similar to the ones derived by Cardaliaguet et al. [15], with different types of nonlinearities. Finally, the third
step of our program, namely (iii) above, relies on a proof of the sufficient part of the Prontryagin maximum
principle for mean field games with interaction through the controls. This is the easiest of the three steps. Here
we follow the idea of [18, Theorem 2.2] consisting in freezing a flow of measures, applying the standard maximum
principle, and then using the consistency condition to conclude.
Besides the method and its consequence in terms of (non-cooperative) large population games discussed so far,
we illustrate applications of the “forward-backward propagation of chaos” mentioned in (ii) above in two other
ways. First, we consider the convergence of the optimal control of N -player cooperative games to the solution of
an associated McKean-Vlasov control problem. In addition, we also use it to prove convergence of a system of
second order parabolic partial differential equations written on an Euclidean space to a so-called master equation,
a second order PDE written on the Wasserstein space. This allows for convergence results to PDEs on infinite
dimensional spaces similar to the ones derived by Cardaliaguet et al. [15], with different types of nonlinearities.
1.2. Literature review. The investigation of the limit theory in large population games started with the works
of Lasry & Lions [55; 56] further extended by Feleqi [33], Bardi & Priuli [4] and Gomes et al. [41]. These
papers share the limitations of treating either problems with linear coefficients or assuming that agents have
controls which are not allowed to depend on other players’ states. In the breakthrough works of Lacker [52]
and Fischer [34], the authors prove rather general convergence results for the empirical measure of the states
of the agents at equilibrium using probabilistic techniques. We also refer to Lacker [54] for interesting further
developments, notably for the case of closed-loop controls. The analyses of these authors use the notion of relaxed
controls and study associated controlled martingale problems. This technique seems hard to extend to games with
control interactions considered here. However, one central advantage of this approach is that it does not assume
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uniqueness of the mean field equilibrium, which we do (at least in our main theorem). This shortcoming is shared
with the PDE-based approaches of Delarue et al. [29, 30] and Cardaliaguet et al. [14]. In fact, our approach is
related to these methods in that they both rely on optimality conditions characterizing the equilibrium. However,
instead of using optimality conditions phrased in terms of PDEs, we use FBSDEs characterizations. As a result,
the technique developed here is a purely probabilistic one and we do not restrict ourselves to Markovian controls
as in the PDE approaches.
Regarding the limit theory for the optimal control of McKean-Vlasov dynamics, this line of work was initiated
by Lacker [53] and recently extended by Djete et al. [32] to the case of interactions through the controls as
we do here. Again, these two papers are based on the theory of relaxed controls. While the setting of [32]
is more general than ours, we believe that our proof makes the result a little more accessible to researchers
without extensive knowledge of the theory of relaxed controls. In addition, we do not obtain only convergence
of the value function or of the laws of the optimal state processes, but convergence of the optimal controls and
we do not need to worry about equivalence of weak, strong and relaxed formulations of the control problem.
Beyond its methodological aspects, our paper contributes to the large population game and the mean field game
literature by its analysis of games with control interactions. Mean field games with such interactions are sometimes
referred to as “extended MFG” or “MFG of controls” and have been introduced by Gomes et al. [42]; Gomes and
Voskanyan [40]. Interaction through the controls’ distribution is particularly relevant in economics and finance,
see e.g. [25; 45; 13] and [39, Section 3.3.1] (see also [20, Sections 1.3.2 and 4.7.1]). Some aspects of the PDE
approach and the probabilistic approach to such games have been treated respectively in [9; 10; 50] and in [22].
As in many fields, linear-quadratic models are particularly appealing due to their tractability, see e.g. [2; 44] for
applications to energy production. We will also use linear-quadratic models to illustrate the main ideas behind
our convergence results.
1.3. Organization of the paper. In the next section we present the probabilistic setting and formally state
our main results pertaining to the convergence of the N -Nash equilibrium to the mean field equilibrium. The
emphasis is put on non-asymptotic results and concentration estimates. We also state our results on approximation
of the master equation by PDEs on finite dimensional spaces. Section 3 is dedicated to the proofs of versions of
Pontryagin’s maximum principle for games with interaction through the controls, and to make our program more
transparent we provide a detailed analysis of the case of linear-quadratic games. The investigation of propagation
of chaos for forward-backward interacting particles is carried out in Section 4. These elements are put together
in Section 5 to prove the main results stated in Section 2. The analysis of cooperative games and MKV control
is relegated to Section 5.3. In Section 6, we prove our results related to the master equation. We provide some
concluding comments in Section 7.
2. Main results: formal statements
Let T > 0 and d ∈ N be fixed, and denote by Ω := C([0, T ],Rd) the space of continuous functions from [0, T ]
to Rd, by W the canonical mapping of Ω given by Wt(ω) = ω(t) and by P the Wiener measure. For every
positive integer N , let W 1, . . . ,WN be N independent copies of W and F0 be an initial σ-field independent
of W 1, . . . ,WN . We equip Ω with the filtration FN := (FNt )t∈[0,T ], which is the completion of the filtration
generated by W 1, . . . ,WN and F0. Without further mention, we will always use the identifications
W ≡W 1 and F ≡ F1.
Given a vector x := (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ (Rn)N , for any n ∈ N, denote by
LN(x) :=
1
N
N∑
j=1
δxj
the empirical measures associated to x. It is clear that LN(x) belongs to Pp(Rn), the set of probability measures
on Rn with finite p-moments. Given a random variable X , we denote by
L(X) the law of X with respect to P .
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Throughout the paper, C denotes a generic strictly positive constant. In the computations, the constant C can
change from line to line, but this will not always be mentioned. However, C will never depend on N .
Let us now formally state the main results of this work.
2.1. The N-player game. We consider an N -agent game where player i chooses an admissible strategy αi to
control her state process, which has dynamics
(1) dX
i,α
t = b(t,X
i,α
t , α
i
t, L
N(X
α
t , αt))dt+ σdW
i
t , X
i,α
0 ∼ µ(0),
for some function b, a matrix σ and a distribution µ(0) ∈ P2(Rℓ), where the state depends on an average of the
states and controls of all the players through the empirical measure LN(X
α
t , αt). The initial states X
i,α
0 are
assumed to be i.i.d. Let m ∈ N and let A ⊆ Rm be a closed convex set and fix a constant A > 0 (which does not
depend on N). The set of admissible strategies is defined as1
A :=
{
α : [0, T ]× Ω→ A progressive such that E
[ ∫ T
0
|αt|2 dt
]
< A
}
.
Given two functions f and g, the cost that agent i seeks to minimize, when the strategy profile is α = (α1, . . . , αN ),
is
J(αi;α−i) := J i(α) := E
[∫ T
0
f(t,X
i,α
t , α
i
t, L
N(X
α
t , αt))dt + g(X
i,α
T , L
N (X
α
T ))
]
,
where we denote α−i := (α1, . . . , αi−1, αi+1, . . . , αN ). One is usually interested in constructing a Nash equilibrium
αˆ := (αˆi, . . . , αˆn), that is, admissible strategies (αˆ1, . . . , αˆN ) such that for every i = 1, . . . , N and α ∈ A it holds
that
J i(αˆ) ≤ J(αi; αˆ−i).
When such a Nash equilibrium exists for every N , our aim is to investigate its asymptotic properties as N →∞.
In particular, we give (regularity) conditions on the coefficients of the diffusions and the cost under which the Nash
equilibrium of the N -player game converges to the mean-field equilibrium which we define below. We denote by
W2(ξ, ξ′) the second order Wasserstein distance between two probability measures ξ, ξ′ and by ∂ξh, ∂µh and ∂νh
the so-called L-derivatives of a function h in the variable of the probability measure ξ ∈ P2(Rℓ×Rm), µ ∈ P2(Rℓ)
and ν ∈ P2(Rm), respectively. See e.g. [3; 58] or [20, Chapter 5] for definition and further details.
We will use the following assumptions, on which we comment after stating our main results, see Remark 4.
(A1) The function b : [0, T ] × Rℓ × Rm × P2(Rℓ × Rm) → Rℓ is continuously differentiable in its last three
arguments and satisfies the Lipschitz continuity and linear growth conditions
|b(t, x, a, ξ)− b(t, x′, a, ξ′)| ≤ C(|x− x′|+W2(ξ, ξ′))
|b(t, x, a, ξ)| ≤ C
(
1 + |x|+ |a|+
(∫
Rℓ+m
|v|2 ξ(dv)
)1/2 )
for some C > 0 and all x, x′ ∈ Rℓ, a ∈ Rm, t ∈ [0, T ] and ξ ∈ P2(Rℓ × Rm).
The function f : [0, T ] × Rℓ × Rm × P(Rℓ × Rm) → R is continuously differentiable in its last three
arguments and of quadratic growth:
|f(t, x, a, ξ)| ≤ C
(
1 + |x|2 + |a|2 +
∫
Rℓ+m
|v|2 ξ(dv)
)
.
The function g : Rℓ × P(Rℓ)→ R is continuously differentiable and of quadratic growth:
|g(x, µ)| ≤ C
(
1 + |x|2 +
∫
Rℓ
|v|2 µ(dv)
)
.
1Unless otherwise stated, we denote by | · | the Euclidean norm and by ab := a · b the inner product, regardless of the dimension
of the Euclidean space.
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(A2) The functions b and f can be decomposed as
(2) b(t, x, a, ξ) := b1(t, x, a, µ) + b2(t, x, ξ) and f(t, x, a, ξ) = f1(t, x, a, µ) + f2(t, x, ξ)
for some functions b1, b2, f1 and f2.
(A3) Considering the function
(3) H(t, x, y, a, ξ) = f(t, x, a, ξ) + b(t, x, a, µ)y,
there is γ > 0 such that
(4) H(t, x, y, a, ξ)−H(t, x, y, a′, ξ)− (a− a′)∂aH(t, x, y, a, ξ) ≥ γ|a− a′|2
for all a, a′ ∈ A and the functions x 7→ g(x, µ) and (x, a) 7→ H(t, x, y, a, ξ) are convex, where µ is the first
marginal of ξ. In addition, the functions ∂aH(t, ·, ·, ·, ·), ∂xH(t, ·, ·, ·, ·) and ∂xg(·, ·) are Lipschitz continuous
and of linear growth.
(A4) For every (t, x, a, ξ) ∈ [0, T ]× Rℓ × A× P2(Rℓ×m) and (u, v) ∈ Rℓ × Rm we have
|∂µb(t, x, a, µ)(u)| ≤ C
|∂ξf(t, x, a, ξ)(u, v)| ≤ C
(
1 + |u|+ |v|+ |x|+ |a|+
(∫
Rℓ+m
|v|2ξ(dv)
)1/2 )
|∂µg(x, µ)(u)| ≤ C
(
1 + |u|+ |x|+
(∫
Rℓ
|v|2µ(dv)
)1/2 )
.
(A5) The matrix σ is uniformly elliptic. That is, there is a constant c > 0 such that
〈σσ′x, x〉 ≥ c|x|2 for every x ∈ Rℓ.
2.2. The Mean field game. The mean field game that corresponds to the above N -player game is described as
follows: Given a flow of distributions (ξt)t∈[0,T ] with ξt ∈ P2(Rℓ × Rm) with first marginal µt ∈ P2(Rℓ), the cost
of an infinitesimal agent is
Jξ(α) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xαt , αt, ξt)dt+ g(X
α
T , µT )
]
with the dynamics
dXαt = b(t,X
α
t , αt, ξt)dt+ σdWt, X
α
0 ∼ µ(0).
The goal for the agent is to find αˆξ minimizing Jξ and satisfying the fixed point (or consistency) condition
ξt = L(X αˆ
ξ
t , αˆ
ξ
t ) for all t.
The first main result of this paper is to prove the following link between the N -player game and the (asymptotic)
MFG:
Theorem 1. Let conditions (A1)-(A5) be satisfied and assume that there is k > 2 such that µ(0) admits moments
of order k. Assume that the N -player game admits a Nash equilibrium αˆN ∈ AN and that the mean field game
admits at most one mean field equilibrium. Then, the mean field game admits a mean field equilibrium αˆ ∈ A
and for each i = 1, . . . , N it holds that
E[|αˆi,Nt − αˆt|2] ≤ C(rN,m+ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k)
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for all t ∈ [0, T ] and N ∈ N large enough and some constant C > 0 where, for any M,N, k we put rN,M,k :=
rN,M,k,2 and
(5) rN,M,k,p :=

N−1/2 +N−(k−p)/k, if p > M/2 and k 6= 2p
N−1/2 log(1 +N) +N−(k−p)/k, if p =M/2 and k 6= 2p
N−2/M +N−(k−p)/k, if M > 2p and k 6=M/(M − p).
In particular, αˆi,N converges to αˆ in L2(Ω× [0, T ];P ⊗ dt).
In the special case of linear models with quadratic cost functions the rate of convergence can be substantially
improved. Since this rate is obtained with different (and simpler) arguments we present the proof separately, see
Theorem 9. We now complement Theorem 1 with concentration estimates for the N -Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 2. Under the conditions of Theorem 1, it holds that
E
[W2(LN (αˆt),L(αˆt))] ≤ C(N−1 + rN,2ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k).
for all (t, N) ∈ [0, T ]× N.
If in addition µ(0) is a Dirac mass then there is a constant c(Lf ) depending only on the Lipschitz constants of
b, f, g and ∂xH such that if T ≤ c(Lf ), then for every N ≥ 1 and a > 0 it holds that
(6) P (h(αˆNt )− E[h(αˆNt )] ≥ a) ≤
C
Na2
+ e−Ka
2
for two given constants K,C which do not depend on N and for every 1-Lipschitz function h : RmN → R. In
particular, for N large enough it holds that
(7) P
(
W2
(
LN (αˆNt ),L(αˆt)
) ≥ a) ≤ C
a2N2
+ e−KNa
2
.
If the functions b, f and g are such that
(8)
{
|∂aH(t, x, a, ξ)|+ |∂xH(t, x, a, ξ)| ≤ C(1 + |a|+
∫
Rm
v ν(dv))
|∂xg(x, µ)| ≤ C
where ν is the second marginal of ξ, then the estimates (6) and (7) hold for every T > 0.
Before going any further, let us make a few remarks concerning our assumptions.
Remark 3. We do not assume uniqueness of the N -Nash equilibrium. We will show in the course of the proof
that every N -Nash equilibrium is characterized by an FBSDE which admits a unique solution, but this FBSDE
may depend on the choice of the N -equilibrium.
However, we will need the (McKean-Vlasov) FBSDE characterizing the mean field equilibrium to have a unique
solution, at least in law. This is the (only) reason why we assumed uniqueness of the mean field equilibrium. In
other words, the assumption on uniqueness of the mean field equilibrium can be replaced by uniqueness of a
characterizing McKean-Vlasov FBSDE, see Corollary 23 for the statement and Remark 13 for a discussion and
references on uniqueness of FBSDEs.
Remark 4. Let us now briefly comment on the assumptions made in Theorems 1 and 2. In a nutshell, both
theorems tell us that under sufficient regularity and integrability of the coefficients of the game, we have convergence
with explicit convergence rates. Condition (A1), (A3) and (A4) speak to these regularity and integrability
conditions. These conditions, along with the convexity property (4) are typically assumed in the literature, even
to guarantee solvability see e.g. [46; 6].
The conditions in (A2) are structural conditions on the coefficients. These conditions are probably not essential
from a mathematical standpoint. They are due to our method, which consists in finding a (more or less) explicit
representation of the equilibrium in terms of processes whose convergence can be derived. Thus, the conditions
in (A2) can be replaced by any other conditions ensuring such representation of the equilibrium. Notice that (2)
is not needed when we do not have mean-field interaction through the controls, but only through the states. The
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Lipschitz assumptions on ∂xH and ∂aH in (A3) are not necessary when ∂xg is bounded and ∂xf and ∂xb are
bounded in x. In fact, in this case, BSDE estimates show that the function ∂xH can be restricted to bounded y’s,
so that these Lipschitz continuity conditions are automatically satisfied if ∂xb is Lipschitz.
In Section 5.3 we discuss the case of cooperative games, that is, when N -agent simultaneously try to minimize
some “social” cost. When the number of agents grows to infinity, this type of problems leads to the optimal control
of McKean-Vlasov (MKV) dynamics, also called mean field (type) control (MFC), see [7; 20]. From a theoretical
standpoint, the main novelty of this type of problems is that the drift and the cost functions not only involve the
state and the control of the controller, but also the distribution of the state and possibly of the control. Besides
appearing as the asymptotic limits for the control of a large number of collaborative agents, these problems can
also be introduced as single agent problems whose evolution and costs depend upon the distribution of her own
state. Such problems have found a wide range of applications in distributed robotics, energy production, risk
management, and finance. The techniques we develop in this work further allow us to prove an analogue of
Theorem 1 for this type of problems.
2.3. The Master equation. The main object of interest when investigating mean field games via analytical
methods is the so-called master equation introduced by P.-L. Lions [58] (see also [15]). Given a matrix σ and
three functions B,F and G, a master equation is an equation of the form
∂tV (t, x, µ) +B(x, V (t, x, µ), ξ)∂xV (t, x, µ) +
1
2 tr(∂xxV (t, x, µ)σ(x)σ
′(x))
+F (x, V (t, x, µ), ∂xV (t, x, µ)σ(x), ξ)
+
∫
Rd
∂µV (t, x, µ)(y) · B(y, V (t, x, µ), ξ)dµ(y) +
∫
Rd
1
2
tr (∂y∂µV (t, x, µ)(y)σ(x)σ
′(x)) dµ(y) = 0
V (T, x, µ) = G(x, µ)
(9)
with (t, x, µ) ∈ [0, T )× Rd × P2(Rd), ξ is the joint law of (χ, V (t, χ, µ)) when L(χ) = µ. The derivative
∂µV (t, x, µ)(y)
denotes the L-derivative of the function V in the direction of the probability measure µ. Here, the term
tr(∂xxV (t, x, µ)σσ
′) is to be understood coordinate-wise, i.e., tr(∂xxV (t, x, µ)σσ
′) =
(
tr(∂xxV
i(t, x, µ)σσ′)
)
i
,
where V = (V 1, . . . , V q)⊤ take values in Rq.
Partial differential equations on the Wasserstein space have been extensively studied in connection to fluid
mechanics and optimal transport, see e.g. [37; 38; 36; 49] and the references therein. Work on such equations has
known a renewed interest due to their fundamental importance in mean-field games. In fact, the PDE (9) can
be shown to characterize the derivative of the value function of a mean-field game with interaction through the
controls. For instance, the analysis of equation (9) should also provide arguments for the convergence of N -player
games to mean-field games, see [14; 12; 29].
The method developed in the present paper will allow to derive an approximation result for the solution V of
the PDE (9) written on the infinite dimensional space [0, T ]×Rd×P2(Rd) by a sequence of solutions of a system
of PDEs written on the finite dimensional space [0, T ]× (Rd)n. More precisely, we will be interested in the system
of PDEs, for i = 1, . . . , N ,
(10)

∂tv
i,N (t, x) +B(xi, v
i,N (t, x), 1N
∑N
j=1 δ(xj,vj,N (t,x)))∂xiv
i,N (t, x) + 12 tr
(
∂xixiv
i,N (t, x)σ(xi)σ
′(xi)
)
+F
(
xi, v
i,N (t, x), ∂xiv
i,N (t, x)σ(xi),
1
N
∑N
j=1 δ(xj,vj,N (t,x))
)
= 0 with (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× (Rd)N
vi,N (T, x) = G
(
xi, L
N(x)
)
, x = (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ (Rd)N .
The following condition is taken (almost verbatim) from [26] and guarantees the existence of a unique solution V
of (9) provided that T is small enough.
(PDE) The function σ : Rd → Rd×d is bounded, and the functions B : Rd × Rq × P2(Rd × Rq) → Rd, F :
Rd ×Rq ×Rq×d ×P2(Rd ×Rq)→ Rq and G : Rd ×P2(Rd) do not depend on time, are twice continuously
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differentiable in w = (x, y, z) and µ with bounded and Lipschitz continuous derivatives (with common
bound and Lipschitz constant denoted by Lf). The functions B and F are bounded in x, i.e.
|B(x, y, ξ)|+ |F (x, y, ξ)| ≤ C(1 + |y|+ (∫ |v|2 ξ(dv))1/2).
There is a constant α ≥ 0, a function Φα : (L2(Ω,FT , P ;Rd+q))2 ∋ (χ, χ′) 7→ Φα(χ, χ′) ∈ R+ which is
continuous at any point (χ, χ) of the diagonal such that
Φα(χ, χ
′) ≤ E
[(
1 + |χ|2α + |χ′|2α + ‖χ‖2α2
)
|χ− χ′|
]1/2
for all χ, χ ∈ L2(Ω,FT , P ;Rd+q) with L(χ) = L(χ′) such that letting h = B,F or G, it holds
|∂wh(w,L(χ)) − ∂wh(w′,L(χ′))| ≤
(
|w − w′|+Φα(χ, χ′)
)
for all w = (x, y, z), w′ = (x′, y′, z′) and χ, χ′ ∈ L2(Ω,FT , P ;Rd+q). The mapping v 7→ ∂ξh(w, ξ)(v) is
Lipschitz continuous and the mapping (w, v) 7→ ∂µh(w, µ)(v) is continuously differentiable at any point
(w, v) such that v is in the support of µ, (w, v) 7→ ∂v[∂µh(w, µ)](v) and (w, v) 7→ ∂w[∂µh(w, µ)](v) are
continuous and it holds
E
[|∂w[∂µh(w,L(χ))](χ) − ∂w[∂µh(w′,L(χ′))](χ′)|2]1/2
+ E
[|∂v[∂µh(w,L(χ))](χ) − ∂v[∂µh(w′,L(χ′))](χ′)|2]1/2 ≤ L (|w − w′|+Φα(χ, χ′)) .
Theorem 5. Assume that the condition (PDE) is in force and that (A5) is satisfied. Then, there is a constant
c(Lf ) > 0 such that if T ≤ c(Lf ), for each i = 1, . . . , N the sequence (vi,N )N converges to V in the sense that,
for every k > 2, for every i.i.d. sequence (χi)i∈N in L
k(Ω,Ft, P ;Rd) and every µ ∈ P2(Rd) with L(χ1) = µ, it
holds that
(11) E
[|vi,N (t, χ1, . . . , χN )− V (t, χ1, µ)|2] ≤ C(rN,q+d,k + rN,d,k)
for every t ∈ [0, T ], and for some constant C ≥ 0 depending only on Lf , T , σ and E[|ξ1|k].
This result is stated for small enough time horizon because of our fully probabilistic arguments which use
solutions of coupled FBSDEs of McKean-Vlasov type. Such equations typically do not possess unique solutions
for arbitrary large T , see for instance [17, Section 2.6]. However, when uniqueness can be guaranteed, Theorem
5 extends to arbitrary T > 0, see Corollary 26 below. Theorem 5 is of independent interest, since quasilinear
system of PDEs of the form (10) have been extensively studied, and convergence results as Theorem 5 can allow
to better understand (9). Theorem 5 should also have consequences in terms of large population games. This
direction will be investigated elsewhere since we already have Theorem 1.
3. Pontryagin’s maximum principles and linear-quadratic games
As explained in the introduction, two elements of our three-step approach to derive the limit consist in proving
Pontryagin maximum principles for N -agent games and for mean field games. This section is dedicated to these
problems. In the case of N -agent games we prove the “necessary part” of the maximum principle. Since the case
of mean field games is less involved, we prove both the “necessary” and the “sufficient” parts, even though only
the latter is needed for the limit. As an example, we conclude this section by specializing the computations to
linear quadratic games and derive convergence rates for this important case.
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3.1. Pontryagin’s maximum principle for N-agent games. The goal of this section is to prove Pontryagin’s
maximum principle of the N -agent game. The main result of this part is the following. In the proof, and in the
rest of the paper, for each p ≥ 1 and k ∈ N we denote
Sp(Rk) :=
{
Y ∈ H0(Rk)
∣∣∣E sup
0≤t≤T
|Yt|2 < +∞
}
and Hp(Rk) :=
{
Z ∈ H0(Rk)
∣∣∣E ∫ T
0
|Zt|2dt < +∞
}
,
with H0(Rk) being the space of all Rk-valued progressively measurable processes.
Theorem 6. Let condition (A1), (A4) and (A5) be satisfied. If αˆ is a Nash equilibrium of the N -player game,
then for any admissible control β = (β1, . . . , βN ) it holds
(12) ∂αiH
N,i(X
αˆ
t , αˆt, Y
i,·
t )(β
i
t − αˆit) ≥ 0 P ⊗ dt-a.s., for all i,
where HN,i is the i-player’s Hamiltonian given by
HN,i(t, x, α, y) := f
(
t, xi, αi, LN (x, α)
)
+
N∑
j=1
b
(
t, xj , αj , LN (x, α)
)
yi,j
and (Y i,j , Zi,j,k)i,j,k solves the adjoint equation
(13) dY i,jt = −∂xjHN,i(t,Xαˆt , αˆt, Y i,·t )dt+
N∑
k=1
Zi,j,kt dW
k
t , Y
i,j
T = ∂xig
N,i(X
αˆ
T )
with gN,i(x) := g(xi, LN (x)) and Y i,· = (Y i,1, . . . , Y i,N ).
Note that (Y i,j , Zi,j,k)i,j,k implicitly depend upon αˆ but we omit to write this dependence to alleviate the
notation.
Proof. For x = (x1, . . . , xN ), α = (α1, . . . , αN ), we let
fN,i(t, x, α) := f
(
t, xi, αi, LN(x, α)
)
and bN,i(t, x, α) := b
(
t, xi, αi, LN(x, α)
)
.
Let βi be a control and let ηi = βi − αˆi. We denote by Γi,j the perturbation of Xj,αˆ when player i changes her
control from αˆi to αˆi + ǫηi (which is admissible by convexity of A), i.e., Γi,jt := ddǫ
(
X
j,(αˆi+ǫηi;αˆ−i)
t
)∣∣ǫ=0. It has
the dynamics
dΓi,jt =
(
N∑
k=1
∂xkb
N,j(t,X
j,αˆ
t , αˆt)Γ
i,k
t + ∂αib
N,j(t,X
αˆ
t , αˆt)η
i
t
)
dt, Γi,j0 = 0.
We define the adjoint processes (Y i,j , Zi,j,k) ∈ S2(Rℓ)×H2(Rℓ×d) by
(14) dY i,jt = −∂xjHN,i(t,Xαˆt , αˆt, Y i,·t )dt+
N∑
k=1
Zi,j,kt dW
k
t , Y
i,j
T = ∂xjg
N,i(X
αˆ
T ).
Notice that the adjoint equation is well-posed. In fact, it follows by standard SDE estimates that the processes
X i,αˆ are in Sp(Rℓ) for all p ≥ 2. Therefore, by Lipschitz continuity of b it is easily checked that the adjoint
equation is a Lipschitz (actually linear) equation and by quadratic growth of g, the terminal condition is square
integrable. Thus, the claim follows by standard BSDE theory, see e.g. [61].
Consider the sequence of stopping times (which implicitly depends on i)
τn := inf
{
t > 0 :
∫ t
0
N∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
|Γi,js Zi,j,ks |2 ds ≥ n
}
∧ T.
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We have τn ↑ T . Now, we compute the perturbation of the cost functional as follows:
lim
ǫ↓0
J(αˆi + ǫηi; αˆ−i)
= E
∫ T
0
 N∑
j=1
∂xjf
N,i(t,X
αˆ
t , αˆt)Γ
i,j
t + ∂αif
N,i(t,X
αˆ
t , αˆt)η
i
t
 dt
+ E
 N∑
j=1
∂xjg
N,i(X
αˆ
T )Γ
i,j
T

= lim
n→∞
E
∫ τn
0
 N∑
j=1
∂xjH
N,i(t,X
αˆ
t , αˆt, Y
i,·
t )Γ
i,j
t + ∂αiH
N,i(t,X
αˆ
t , αˆt, Y
i,·
t )η
i
t
 dt
+ E
 N∑
j=1
Y i,jT Γ
i,j
T

−E
∫ τn
0
 N∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
∂xjb
N,k(t,X
αˆ
t , αˆt)Y
i,k
t Γ
i,j
t +
N∑
k=1
∂αib
N,k(t,X
αˆ
t , αˆt)Y
i,k
t η
i
t
 dt

= lim
n→∞
E
∫ τn
0
− N∑
j=1
Γi,jt dY
i,j
t + ∂αiH
N,i(t,X
αˆ
t , αˆt, Y
i,·
t )η
i
tdt
+ ∫ τn
0
N∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
Γi,jt Z
i,j,k
t dW
k
t

−E
∫ τn
0
N∑
j=1
Y i,jt dΓ
i,j
t
+ E
 N∑
j=1
Y i,jT Γ
i,j
T

= E
[∫ T
0
∂αiH
N,i(t,X
αˆ
t , αˆt, Y
i,·
t )η
i
tdt
]
,
where, in the last equality, we used Itoˆ’s formula and the martingale property of
∫ τn
0
Γi,jt Z
i,j,k
t dW
k
t . If αˆ is a
Nash equilibrium, then in particular player i’s control is optimal against the other players’ controls, hence for any
βi,
(15) 0 ≤ lim
ǫ↓0
J(αˆi + ǫηi; αˆ−i).
Now we use standard arguments to conclude, see e.g. the proof of [20, Theorem 6.14]. In fact, let t ∈ [0, T ] and let β˜
be an Ft-adapted process with values in A. Fix δ > 0 and let β be the progressive process β := β˜1[t,t+δ]c+αi1[t,t+δ].
Taking the limit as δ goes to zero, it then follows from (15) and Lebesgue differentiability theorem that
(16) E
[
∂αiH
N,i(t,Xt, αt, Y
i,·
t )(β˜t − αˆit)
] ≥ 0 dt-a.s.
Next, let β = (β1, . . . , βN ) be a family of admissible controls. Letting β˜ be equal to βi on a set in Ft and to αit
otherwise, we obtain (12). 
For later reference and for convenience of the reader, we spell-out the adjoint equation (14) in terms of the
functions f, b, g appearing in the game. From [21, Proposition 5.35], we have
∂xjg
N,i(x, α) = δi,j∂xg
(
xi, LN(x)
)
+
1
N
∂µg
(
xi, LN(x)
)
(xj),
where δi,j = 1 if and only if i = j and 0 otherwise. Similar relations hold for f and b, and for the partial
derivatives with respect to the control variables. We deduce that
(17) Y i,jT = δi,j∂xg
(
X
i,αˆ
T , L
N(X
αˆ
T )
)
+
1
N
∂µg
(
X
i,αˆ
T , L
N (X
αˆ
T )
)
(X
j,αˆ
T ),
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and
dY i,jt = −∂xjHN,i(t,X αˆt , αˆt, Y i,·t )dt+
N∑
k=1
Zi,j,kt dW
k
t
= −∂xj
(
fN,i(t,X
αˆ
t , αˆt) +
N∑
k=1
bN,k(t,X
αˆ
t , αˆt)Y
i,k
t
)
dt+
N∑
k=1
Zi,j,kt dW
k
t
= −
(
δi,j∂xf
(
t,X
i,αˆ
t , αˆ
i
t, L
N(X
αˆ
t , αˆt)
)
+
1
N
∂µf
(
X
i,αˆ
t , αˆ
i
t, L
N (X
αˆ
t , αˆt)
)
(X
j,αˆ
t )
)
dt
−
N∑
k=1
(
δk,j∂xb
(
t,X
k,αˆ
t , αˆ
k
t , L
N (X
αˆ
t , αˆt)
)
Y i,kt +
1
N
∂µb
(
t,X
k,αˆ
t , αˆ
k
t , L
N (X
αˆ
t , αˆt)
)
(X
j,αˆ
t )Y
i,k
t
)
dt
+
N∑
k=1
Zi,j,kdW kt
= −
(
δi,j∂xf
(
t,X
i,αˆ
t , αˆ
i
t, L
N(X
αˆ
t , αˆt)
)
+
1
N
∂µf
(
t,X
i,αˆ
t , αˆ
i
t, L
N (X
αˆ
t , αˆt)
)
(X
j,αˆ
t )
)
dt
−
(
∂xb
(
t,X
j,αˆ
t , αˆ
j
t , L
N(X
αˆ
t , αˆt)
)
Y i,jt + E(X˜,α˜,Y˜ )∼ζN,it
[
∂µb
(
t, X˜t, α˜t, L
N(X
αˆ
t , αˆt)
)
(X
j,αˆ
t )Y˜t
])
dt
+
N∑
k=1
Zi,j,kdW kt(18)
where we used the notation
ζ
N,i
t =
1
N
N∑
j=1
δ
(X
j,αˆ
t ,αˆ
j
t ,Y
i,j
t )
for the empirical distribution of the triple (X
j,αˆ
t , αˆ
j
t , Y
i,j
t )j .
3.2. Pontryagin’s maximum principle for mean field games of controls. Let us recall that the Hamil-
tonian H is defined by (3), i.e.,
H(t, x, α, y, ξ) = f(t, x, α, ξ) + b(t, x, α, ξ)y.
We prove the following optimality conditions:
Proposition 7. If αˆ is a mean field equilibrium such that the mapping t 7→ ξαˆt := L(X αˆt , αˆt) is bounded and
Borel measurable, then it holds that
(19) H(t,X αˆt , αˆt, Y
αˆ
t , ξ
αˆ
t ) = inf
a∈A
H(t,X αˆt , a, Y
αˆ
t , ξ
αˆ
t ) P ⊗ dt-a.s.
with (X αˆt , Y
αˆ
t , Z
αˆ
t , αˆt) solving the FBSDE system
(20)
{
dX αˆt = b(t,X
αˆ
t , αˆt, ξ
αˆ
t )dt+ σdWt, X
αˆ
0 ∼ µ(0),
dY αˆt = −∂xH(t,X αˆt , αˆt, Y αˆt , ξαˆt )dt+ Zαˆt dWt, Y αˆT = ∂xg(X αˆT ,L(X αˆT )).
Reciprocally, let αˆ be an admissible control with associated controlled process X αˆ and adjoint processes (Y αˆ, Zαˆ)
as given by (20). Assume t 7→ ξαˆt = L(X αˆt , αˆt) is bounded and Borel measurable. Assume that for each ξ ∈
P(Rℓ×Rm) with first marginal µ the functions x 7→ g(x, µ) and (x, a) 7→ H(t,X αˆ, a, Y αˆt , ξ) are P ⊗dt-a.s. convex
and that αˆ satisfies (19). Then αˆ is a mean field equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is rather standard so we only provide the main steps. First, given a measurable flow of measures
ξ = (ξt) with first marginals (µt), where ξt ∈ P(Rℓ × Rm) and µt ∈ P(Rℓ), we study the (standard) optimal
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control problem solved by a representative player. The (standard version of) stochastic Pontryagin maximum
principle, see for instance [20, Theorem 2.15], yields that for every admissible control β,
H(t,X αˆ,ξt , αˆt, Y
αˆ,ξ
t , ξt) = inf
a∈A
H(t,X αˆ,ξt , a, Y
αˆ,ξ
t , ξt) P ⊗ dt-a.s.
where (X αˆ,ξt , Y
αˆ,ξ
t , Z
αˆ,ξ
t , αˆt) solves the FBSDE system{
dX αˆ,ξt = b(t,X
αˆ,ξ
t , αˆt, ξt)dt+ σdWt, X
αˆ,ξ
0 ∼ µ(0),
dY αˆ,ξt = −∂xH(t,X αˆ,ξt , αˆt, Y αˆ,ξt , ξt)dt+ Zαˆ,ξt dWt, Y αˆ,ξT = ∂xg(X αˆ,ξT , µT ).
Second, we use the consistency condition, which states that at equilibrium, we must have ξt = L(X αˆ,ξt , αˆt). This
concludes the proof of the necessary part.
The proof of the sufficiency claim is similar. Fix the flow of measures ξt := L(X αˆt , αˆt) ∈ P(Rℓ × Rm) with
first marginals µt. By the sufficiency part of the (standard version of the) stochastic maximum principle, see e.g.
[20, Theorem 2.16], αˆ is optimal for the control problem parameterized by ξ. That is, Jξ(αˆ) ≤ Jξ(β) for every
admissible β. Since ξt := L(X αˆt , αˆt) this shows that αˆ is a mean field equilibrium. 
Remark 8. It can be argued that the conditions made on the flow of measures ξαˆ are quite strong. We settle for
these conditions since they are enough for our purpose. It is conceivable that they can be weakened if one adapts
the standard proof of Pontryagin’s maximum principle to the mean field game setting.
3.3. The case of linear quadratic games. Our approach to convergence of the Nash-equilibrium of the N -
player game to the mean field game is better explained on the case of linear quadratic problems. This is a
benchmark model that is often used in many applications see e.g. [23; 2; 1]. This further motivates its separate
treatment in this work.
3.3.1. A linear quadratic setting. For simplicity in the remainder of this section, we assume m = ℓ = d = 1 and
we set
(21)

f(t, x, α, ξ) = Qx2 + Q¯x2 +Rα2 + R¯α2 + S¯xα,
b(t, x, α, ξ) = Ax+ A¯x+Bα+ B¯α,
g(x, µ) = QTx
2 + Q¯Tx
2,
where A, A¯, B, B¯,Q, Q¯, and R, R¯ are real numbers, with R 6= 0 and x¯ := ∫ xµ(dx), α¯ := ∫ a ν(da) where µ
and ν are the first and second marginals of ξ, respectively. Although more general linear-quadratic cases could
be considered, this would be at expense of heavier notation and without bringing additional insights about the
methodology. As for the associated N -player game, the Hamiltonian associated to the control problem of the i-th
player takes the form
HN,i(t, x, α, y) = f
(
t, xi, αi, LN(x, α)
)
+
N∑
j=1
b
(
t, xj , αj , LN(x, α)
)
yi,j
= Q|xi|2 + Q¯|xN |2 +R|αi|2 + R¯|αN |2 + S¯xiαN
+
N∑
j=1
(
Axj + A¯xN +Bαj + B¯αN
)
yi,j
where we use the notation
xN :=
1
N
N∑
j=1
xj , αN :=
1
N
N∑
j=1
αj .
At the equilibrium αˆ (if it exists), the optimality condition (16) yields that for every i,
∂αiH
N,i(t,Xt, αˆt, Y
i,·
t ) = 0
14 MATHIEU LAURIE`RE & LUDOVIC TANGPI
where (X,Y , Z) solve the N -player FBSDE system with controls αˆ. For ease of notation we do not make explicit
the dependence of αˆi, X i and (Y i,j , Zi,j,k) in N , nor that of X i in αˆ.
The optimality condition given by Theorem 6 can be written as
0 = 2Rαˆit + 2
1
N
R¯αˆ
N
t +
1
N
S¯X it +
N∑
j=1
(
δi,jB +
1
N
B¯
)
Y i,jt
= 2Rαˆit + 2
1
N
R¯αˆ
N
t +
1
N
S¯X it +BY
i,i
t + B¯Y
i,·
t
N
,(22)
where
Y i,·t
N
:=
1
N
N∑
j=1
Y i,jt .
Note that (22) is a coupled system for αˆt = (αˆ
1
t , . . . , αˆ
N
t ) due to the coupling term αˆ
N
t =
1
N
∑N
j=1 αˆ
i
t. Taking the
average over i = 1, . . . , N , the above condition (22) implies in particular that
0 = 2
(
R+
1
N
R¯
)
αˆ
N
t +
1
N
S¯X
N
t +BY
N
t + B¯Y
N
t ,
where Y
N
t :=
1
N2
∑N
i,j=1 Y
i,j
t and Y
N
t =
1
N
∑N
i=1 Y
i,i
t , so that
αˆ
N
t = −
1
2
(
R + 1N R¯
) [ 1
N
S¯X
N
t +BY
N
t + B¯Y
N
t
]
.
Plugging this in (22), we obtain that for each i,
0 = 2Rαˆit −
1
N R¯(
R + 1N R¯
) [ 1
N
S¯X
N
t +BY
N
t + B¯Y
N
t
]
+
1
N
S¯X it +BY
i,i
t + B¯Y
i,·
t
N
which means that
αˆit = −
1
2
R−1
[
1
N
S¯X it −
1
N R¯(
R+ 1N R¯
) 1
N
S¯X
N
t +BY
i,i
t + B¯Y
i,·
t
N
−
1
N R¯(
R + 1N R¯
) (BY Nt + B¯Y Nt )
]
= −1
2
R−1BY i,it +RN
(
(X it , Y
i,j
t )i,j=1,...,N
)
,(23)
where RN is defined so that the last equality holds. Thus, we have
αˆ
N
t = −
1
2
R−1
[
1
N
S¯
(
1−
1
N R¯(
R+ 1N R¯
))XNt +
(
1−
1
N R¯(
R + 1N R¯
))(BY Nt + B¯Y Nt )
]
= −1
2
R−1BY
N
t +RN
(
(X it , Y
i,j
t )i,j=1,...,N
)
where RN is defined so that the last equality holds. Hence
Bαˆit + B¯αˆ
N
t
= −1
2
BR−1BY i,it −
1
2
B¯R−1BY
N
t +BRN
(
(X it , Y
i,j
t )i,j=1,...,N
)
+ B¯RN
(
(X it , Y
i,j
t )i,j=1,...,N
)
.
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Therefore, the FBSDE system for the N -player game reads
(24)

dX it =
(
AX it + A¯X
N
t − 12BR−1BY i,it − 12 B¯R−1BY
N
t
+BRN
(
(X it , Y
i,j
t )i,j=1,...,N
)
+ B¯RN
(
(X it , Y
i,j
t )i,j=1,...,N
))
dt+ σdW it ,
dY i,jt = −
(
δi,j
[
2QX it − 12 S¯R−1BY
N
t + S¯RN
(
(X it , Y
i,j
t )i,j
)]
+ 1N 2Q¯X
N
t +AY
i,j
t + A¯Y
i,·
t
N
)
dt
+
∑N
k=1 Z
i,j,k
t dW
k
t ,
with initial and terminal conditions
X i0 ∼ µ(0), Y i,jT = δi,j2QTX iT +
1
N
2Q¯TX
N
T .
At this point, the program leading to the proof of the convergence of the N -Nash equilibrium to the solution
of the mean-field game becomes transparent. As seen in (23), the N -Nash equilibrium (αˆi)i is decomposed into
two parts: a term that is proportional to the diagonal of the adjoint state (Y i,j)i,j and another part that should
converge to zero. In fact, a careful inspection of (24) reveals that the terminal condition of the off-diagonal terms
Y i,j (i 6= j) should converge to zero, and since this process solves a linear equation, the whole process should also
vanish in the limit, hence making RN and R¯N vanish as well. Thus, it remains to verify that the diagonal term
Y i,i converges to Y where (X,Y, Z) solves the McKean-Vlasov FBSDE
(25)
{
dXt =
(
AXt + A¯E
[
Xt
]− 12BR−1BYt − 12 B¯R−1BE[Yt]) dt+ σdWt, X0 ∼ µ(0)
dYt = −
(
2QXt − 12 S¯R−1BE
[
Yt
]
+AYt
)
dt+ ZtdWt, YT = 2QTXT
which admits a solution by [20, Theorem 4.29] (this solution is unique when B¯ = 0, see [19, Theorem 5.1]).
Equation (25) in turn comes from the Pontryagin maximum principle for mean field games with interaction
through the controls as asserted by Proposition 7 which further implies that the mean field game equilibrium
should be given by
(26) αˆ = −1
2
R−1BY.
Hence we deduce convergence of the N -Nash equilibrium to the mean field game. This program will be carried out
in Section 5 in full generality. In fact, in the general nonlinear drift case with non necessarily quadratic costs we
do not have explicit formulas for the equilibrium and the mean field game solution. This substantially complicates
the analysis and motivates the next section on the investigation of the asymptotic behavior of interacting FBSDEs
in an abstract setting. Because of the linear structure of the FBSDE characterizing the Nash equilibria in the
linear-quadratic case, the rate of convergence of the N -Nash equilibrium to the mean field equilibrium is optimal
and dimension-free. We therefore state and prove the convergence result in this case separately, as it does not
extend to (or follow from) the more general Theorem 6.
Theorem 9. In the present linear-quadratic case (i.e. the specifications (21)), assume that there is k > 2 such
that µ(0) admits moments of order k, and that either B¯ = 0 or the MFG admits at most one mean field equilibrium.
Then, the MFG admits a mean field equilibrium αˆ and for each i the sequence (αˆi,N ) converges to αˆ ∈ A in the
sense that and it holds that
E
[
|αˆi,Nt − αˆt|2
]
≤ CN−1 for all N.
Remark 10. The assumption on the uniqueness of the MFG equilibrium or on B¯ is only made to ensure unique-
ness of the solution to the MKV FBSDE, which is actually what is required for the argument.
Proof. We first prove the result in the case where the MFG equilibrium is unique and B¯ can be non-zero.
Consider the sequence (X i, Y i,j , Zi,j,k) solving (24). We will show in Lemma 20 that the sequences E[|X it |2]
and E[|Y i,jt |2] are bounded for every (i, j), and in Lemma 21 that for every N ≥ 1 and for every i, j = 1, . . . , N
such that i 6= j it holds
E
[|Y i,jt |2] ≤ CN−1
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for some constant C > 0 and for every t ∈ [0, T ]. These show in particular that the terms Y i,·t
N
, Y
N
t ,
RN
(
(X i, Y i,jt )i,j
)
and RN
(
(X i, Y i,jt )i,j
)
converge to zero in L2 at the rate N−1. Indeed, by Jensen’s inequality
we have that
E
[
|Y i,·t
N
|2
]
≤ 1
N
N∑
j=1
E[|Y i,jt |2] ≤
1
N
E[|Y i,it |2] +
1
N
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
E[|Y i,jt |2]
≤ C 1
N
+ C
N − 1
N2
≤ CN−1,
where the third inequality follows by Lemmas 20 and 21. Similar arguments show that RN
(
(X it , Y
i,j
t )i,j
)
,
RN
(
(X it , Y
i,j
t )i,j
)
and Y
N
t also converge to zero in quadratic norm at the same rate.
Observe that by uniqueness of the mean field equilibrium the McKean-Vlasov system (25) is uniquely solvable.
As explained above, solvability follows from [20, Theorem 4.29], and if the system has two different solutions,
then they give rise to two different mean field equilibria. Thus, let (X˜ i, Y˜ i, Z˜i) be i.i.d. copies of the solution of
the McKean-Vlasov FBSDE (25) satisfying
(27)
dX˜
i
t =
(
AX˜ it + A¯E
[
Xt
]− 12BR−1BY˜ it − 12 B¯R−1BE[Yt]) dt+ σdW it , X˜ i0 ∼ µ(0)
dY˜ it = −
(
2QX˜ it − 12 S¯R−1BE
[
Yt
]
+AY˜ it
)
dt+ Z˜itdW
i
t , Y˜
i
T = 2QT X˜
i
T .
We will assume without loss of generality that X i0 = X˜
i
0. By (24), (25) we have
|Y i,it − Y˜ it | ≤ C1E
[
|X iT − X˜ iT |+
1
N
|XNT |+
∫ T
t
(
|X iu − X˜ iu|+ |Y i,iu − Y˜ iu |
)
du
∣∣∣FNt
]
+ CE
[∫ T
t
(
|Y Nu − E[Y˜ iu ]|+ |RN
(
(X iu, Y
i,j
u )i,j
) |+ 1
N
|XNu |+
∣∣∣∣Y i,·u N ∣∣∣∣) du ∣∣∣FNt
]
(28)
with C1 := max(A, 2Q, 2Q¯T ,
1
2 S¯R
−1B). Similarly using Gronwall’s inequality, for every 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T we have
|X it − X˜ it | ≤
1
2
eATB2R−1
∫ t
s
|Y i,iu − Y˜ iu| du+ C2eAT
∫ t
s
(
|XNu − E[X˜ iu]|+ |Y
N
u − E[Y˜ iu ]|
)
du
+ C
∫ t
s
|RN
(
(X iu, Y
i,j
u )i,j
) |+ |RN ((X iu, Y i,ju )i,j) | du+ eAT |X is − X˜ is|(29)
with C2 := max(A¯,
1
2 B¯R
−1B). Recall that for all t ∈ [0, T ] it holds
E
[
|RN
(
(X it , Y
i,j
t )i,j
)
|2 + |RN
(
(X it , Y
i,j
t )i,j
)
|2 +
∣∣∣∣Y i,·t N ∣∣∣∣2
]
≤ CN−1
and that E[|Y Nt |2] and E[|X
N
t |2] are bounded (see Lemma 20 below). On the other hand, using the fact that
X˜1, . . . , X˜N and Y˜ 1, . . . , Y˜ N are i.i.d. with the same distributions as X and Y respectively (solution of the
McKean-Vlasov FBSDE (25)) and the symmetries E[|X1t −X˜1t |2] = E[|X it−X˜ it |2] and E[|Y 1,1t − Y˜ 1t |2] = E[|Y i,it −
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Y˜ it |2], it holds that for every i = 1, . . . , N and t ∈ [0, T ],
E[|Y Nt − E[Y˜ it ]|2] ≤ 2E

 1
N
N∑
j=1
(Y j,jt − Y˜ jt )
2
+ 2E

 1
N
N∑
j=1
(Y˜ jt − E[Y˜ jt ])
2

≤ 2
N
N∑
j=1
E[|Y j,jt − Y˜ jt |2] +
2
N2
N∑
j=1
E[|Y˜ jt − E[Y˜ jt ]|2]
≤ 2E[|Y i,it − Y˜ it |2] +
2
N
Var(Y˜ it )(30)
and similarly E
[|XNt − E[X˜ it ]|2] ≤ 2E[|X it − X˜ it |2] + 2NVar(X˜ it ).
Let us assume that T ≤ 1. To alleviate the notation, let C4 = e2AB4R−2, C5 = 8C22e2A. Then, coming back
to (29), taking the square and then the expectation on both sides, we have
E
[
|X it − X˜ it |2
]
≤ C4
∫ t
s
E
[
|Y i,iu − Y˜ iu|2
]
du+ C5
∫ t
s
(
E
[
|XNu − E[X˜ iu]|2
]
+ E
[
|Y Nu − E[Y˜ iu]|2
])
du
+ 8C2
∫ t
s
(
E
[|RN ((X iu, Y i,ju )i,j) |2]+ E [|RN ((X iu, Y i,ju )i,j) |2]) du + 4e2AE [|X is − X˜ is|2]
≤ C4
∫ t
s
E
[
|Y i,iu − Y˜ iu|2
]
du
+ C5
∫ t
s
(
2E[|X iu − X˜ iu|2] +
2
N
Var(X˜ iu)
)
du + C5
∫ t
s
(
2E[|Y i,iu − Y˜ iu|2] +
2
N
Var(Y˜ iu)
)
du
+ 16C3N−1 + 4e2AE
[
|X is − X˜ is|2
]
≤ (C4 + 2C5)
∫ t
s
E
[
|Y i,iu − Y˜ iu|2
]
du
+ 2C5
∫ t
s
E[|X iu − X˜ iu|2] du+ 4e2AE
[
|X is − X˜ is|2
]
+
(
16C3 + 4C5C
)
N−1.
By Gronwall’s inequality, we obtain
E
[
|X it − X˜ it |2
]
≤ e2C5
[
(C4 + 2C5)
∫ t
s
E
[
|Y i,iu − Y˜ iu|2
]
du
+ 4e2AE
[
|X is − X˜ is|2
]
+
(
16C3 + 16C5C
)
N−1
]
≤ e2C5
[
T (C4 + 2C5) sup
u∈[s,t]
E
[
|Y i,iu − Y˜ iu|2
]
+ 4e2AE
[
|X is − X˜ is|2
]
+
(
16C3 + 16C5C
)
N−1
]
.(31)
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After taking the squared power in (28) and then the expectation, we plug the last inequality in the resulting
expression from (28), then use (30) to obtain
E
[
|Y i,it − Y˜ it |2
]
≤ 8C21E
[
|X iT − X˜ iT |2 +
1
N2
|XNT |2 +
∫ T
t
(
|X iu − X˜ iu|2 + |Y i,iu − Y˜ iu|2
)
du
]
+ 8C2E
[∫ T
t
(
|Y Nu − E[Y˜ iu]|2 + |RN
(
(X iu, Y
i,j
u )i,j
) |2 + 1
N
|XNu |2 +
∣∣∣∣Y i,·u N ∣∣∣∣2
)
du
]
≤ 8C21
(
e2C5
[
2T (C4 + 2C5) sup
u∈[s,T ]
E
[
|Y i,iu − Y˜ iu|2
]
+ 8e2AE
[
|X is − X˜ is|2
]
+ 2
(
16C3 + 16C5C
)
N−1
]
+
1
N2
E|XNT |2 + T sup
u∈[s,T ]
E
[
|Y i,iu − Y˜ iu|2
] )
+ 8C2
(
T sup
u∈[s,T ]
E
[
|Y i,iu − Y˜ iu |2
]
+ CN−1 +
∫ T
t
E
[
1
N
|XNu |2 +
∣∣∣∣Y i,·u N ∣∣∣∣2
]
du
)
≤ T
(
8C21 (2e
2C5(C4 + 2C5) + 1) + 8C
2
)
sup
u∈[s,T ]
E
[
|Y i,iu − Y˜ iu |2
]
+ 64C21e
2C5e2AE
[
|X is − X˜ is|2
]
+ CN−1
≤ TC6 sup
u∈[s,T ]
E
[
|Y i,iu − Y˜ iu|2
]
+ CE
[
|X is − X˜ is|2
]
+ CN−1(32)
with C6 := 8C
2
1 (2e
2C5(C4 + 2C5) + 1) + 8C
2 (where we used the fact that T ≤ 1 as well as the fact that the first
and second moments of X
N
t and Y
i,·
u
N
are bounded for every t ∈ [0, T ]).
If T < 1C6 , then we have
(33) sup
t∈[s,T ]
E
[|Y i,it − Y˜ it |2] ≤ CN−1 + CE [|X is − X˜ is|2] .
for a constant C that does not depend on N . Now, by the representations (23) and (26) of the best responses,
we have (taking s = 0)
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
|αˆit − αˆt|2
]
≤ C sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
|Y i,it − Yt|2
]
+ C sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
|RN
(
(X it , Y
i,j
t )i,j
)
|2
]
≤ CN−1.
If T ≥ max(1, 1C6 ), we choose a partition {0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tn = T } of [0, T ] such that maxk |tk − tk−1| <
1∧ 1C6 and n = ⌈T/(1∧ 1C6 )⌉. We now implement the above idea going backward in time on the intervals [tk−1, tk].
In fact, by the representations (23) and (26) of the best responses we have
sup
t∈[tn−1,tn]
E
[
|αˆit − αˆt|2
]
≤ CN−1 + CE[|X itn−1 − X˜ itn−1 |2].
Thus, we only need to estimate the term E
[|X itn−1 − X˜ itn−1 |2]. By (31), it can be estimated as
E
[|X itn−1 − X˜ itn−1 |2] ≤ e2C5[T (C4 + 2C5) sup
u∈[tn−2,tn−1]
E
[
|Y i,iu − Y˜ iu|2
]
+ 4e2AE
[
|X itn−2 − X˜ itn−2 |2
]
+
(
16C3 + 16C5C
)
N−1
]
.(34)
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Using exactly the arguments leading to (32) but now on the interval [tn−2, tn−1], thus replacing Y
i,i
T by Y
i,i
tn−1 and
Y˜ iT by Y˜
i
tn−1 , and recalling that E[|Y i,itn−1 − Y˜ itn−1 |2] ≤ CN−1 + CE
[|X itn−1 − X˜ itn−1 |2], we arrive at
sup
t∈[tn−2,tn−1]
E
[|Y i,it − Y˜ it |2] ≤ (tn−1 − tn−2)C6 sup
t∈[tn−2,tn−1]
E
[|Y i,it − Y˜ it |2]+ CN−1
+ CE
[|X itn−2 − X˜ itn−2 |2]
and thus supt∈[tn−2,tn−1]E
[|Y i,it − Y˜ it |2] ≤ CN−1 + CE[|X itn−2 − X˜ itn−2 |2]. Put this together with (34) applied
on the interval [tn−2, tn−1] to obtain
E
[|X itn−1 − X˜ itn−1 |2] ≤ CN−1 + CE[|X itn−2 − X˜ itn−2 |2].
Therefore, we have
sup
t∈[tn−1,tn−2]
E
[|αˆit − αit|2] ≤ (C + C2)N−1 + C2E[|X itn−2 − X˜ itn−2 |2].
Now, repeating the same argument successively on each interval [tn−3, tn−2], . . . , [0, t1] yields
sup
t∈[tn−1,tn−2]
E
[|αˆit − αit|2] ≤ ( n∑
q=1
Cq
)
N−1 + CnE
[|X i0 − X˜ i0|2] = ( n∑
q=1
Cq
)
N−1.
The estimation of E
[|α˜it − αit|2] on each interval [tn−2, tn−1], . . . , [0, t1] is done similarly, in particular we have
sup
t∈[tk−1,tk]
E
[|αˆit − αit|2] ≤ ( k∑
q=1
Cq
)
N−1.
Therefore, we finally obtain the estimate
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
|αˆit − αˆt|2
]
≤ sup
k
sup
t∈[tk−1,tk]
E
[
|αˆit − αˆt|2
]
≤ CN−1,
which concludes the proof when the mean field equilibrium is unique.
If rather assume B¯ = 0, then by [19, Theorem 5.1] the equation (25) admits a unique solution. The rest of the
proof is the same. 
3.3.2. Example: A price impact model. Let us conclude this section with a discussion of an important example of
game with interaction through the control arising in financial engineering: it is that of (high frequency) trading
under price impact. The problem we present here is inspired from [20, Section 1.3.2] with some little modification.
We consider N traders investing on the same stock S and whose respective inventory (number of shares at
time t) is given by
dX it = α
i
t dt+ σ dW
i
t , t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, . . . , N.
Following the Almgren and Chriss model (see [16]), we assume that trading decisions made on the stock have a
permanent effect on its price, and we additionally assume that trading has an instantaneous impact so that the
mid-price is then given by
dSt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
h1(α
i
t) dt+ σ
0 dW 0t + h2(α
i
t), t ∈ [0, T ],
where σ0 > 0 is given, W 0 is a standard Brownian motion independent of the family (W i)1≤i≤N and h1, h2 are
the market impact functions, which are deterministic functions known to all market participants. Denoting by
c(αit) the transaction cost, the amount K
i
t held by the trader i at time t satisfies
dKit = −(αitSt + c(αit)) dt.
Thus, the total wealth of trader i is then given by V it = K
i
t + X
i
tSt, the sum of the cash held and the value of
the inventory. Let us assume that the traders are subject to a liquidation constraint modeled by cX(X
i
t), i.e. a
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function cX of the inventory and a terminal liquidation at maturity given by g(X
i
T ). Thus, if the traders are
risk-neutral then they face the problems of minimizing
J i(α) = E
[ ∫ T
0
cX(X
i
t ) dt+ g(X
i
T )− V iT
]
.
As usual, we assume cX and g to be convex and positive functions. By self-financing assumption and integration
by parts, the above cost function can be re-written as
J i(α) = E
[ ∫ T
0
f(t,X it , L
N(αt), α
i
t) dt+ g(X
i
T )
]
with
f(t, x, ν, α) := c(α) + cX(x) + αh2(α) − xh˜1(ν)
and h˜1(ν) :=
∫
h1(a)ν(da). In the standard Almgren-Chriss model, the (permanent) price impact function h1 is
linear, so that if we also take h2 to be linear and the functions c and cX to be quadratic, then this problem is a
simplified version of the linear-quadratic game considered above. Theoretical and empirical studies suggest that
the temporary price impact function h2 is rather nonlinear [63], in which case convexity, regularity and growth
conditions as in (A3) are needed to assert from Theorem 1 that the limit of the Nash equilibrium of this game
converges to the mean field equilibrium of the associated mean field game.
4. Quantitative propagation of chaos for coupled FBSDE systems
This section studies abstract propagation of chaos type results for forward-backward systems of SDEs. These
results will be central for the proofs of the main theorems, but seem to be of independent interest. Therefore, we
present the section so that it can be read independently.
The main idea is that we consider a system of “particles” evolving forward and backward in time and with
interactions through their empirical distribution. We show that under mild regularity conditions on the coefficients
of the equations describing the dynamics of the equations, the whole system converges to a system of McKean-
Vlasov FBSDEs. Moreover, we derive explicit convergence rates and concentration inequality results. Propagation
of chaos-type results for backward SDEs (not coupled to forward systems) have been previously derived in [11;
47; 57].
Let d, ℓ, q ∈ N, we fix three functions
B : [0, T ]× Rℓ × Rq × P2(Rℓ × Rq)→ Rℓ
F : [0, T ]× Rℓ × Rq × Rq×d × P2(Rℓ × Rq)→ Rq
G : Rℓ × P2(Rℓ)→ Rq
and an ℓ× d matrix σ for some ℓ, d, q ∈ N. Consider the coupled systems of FBSDEs
(35)

X i,Nt = x
i
0 +
∫ t
0
Bu(X
i,N
u , Y
i,N
u , L
N (Xu, Y u)) du+ σW
i
t
Y i,Nt = G(X
i,N
T , L
N(XT )) +
∫ T
t
Fu(X
i,N
u , Y
i,N
u , Z
i,i,N
u , L
N (Xu, Y u)) du−
N∑
k=1
∫ T
t
Zi,k,Nu dW
k
u ,
with i = 1, . . . , N , and for some given i.i.d., F0-measurable random variables x10, . . . , xN0 with values in Rℓ, and
where as above, we used the notation Y := (Y 1, . . . , Y N ) and X := (X1, . . . , XN). We recall that W 1, . . . ,WN
are independent d-dimensional Brownian motions. We will use the following conditions:
(B1) The functions B, F and G are Lipschitz continuous, that is there is a positive constant Lf such that
|Ft(x, y, z, ξ)− Ft(x′, y′, z′, ξ′)| ≤ Lf (|x− x′|+ |y − y′|+ |z − z′|+W2(ξ, ξ′))
|Bt(x, y, ξ) −Bt(x′, y′, ξ′)| ≤ Lf (|x− x′|+ |y − y′|+ |z − z′|+W2(ξ, ξ′))
|G(x, µ) −G(x′, µ′)| ≤ Lf (|x− x′|+W2(µ, µ′))
(36)
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for every t ∈ [0, T ], x, x′ ∈ Rℓ, y, y′ ∈ Rq, z, z′ ∈ Rq×d ξ, ξ′ ∈ P2(Rℓ × Rq) and µ, µ′ ∈ P2(Rℓ) .
(B2) The functions B,F and G satisfy the linear growth conditions
|Bt(x, y, ξ)| ≤ Lf
(
1 + |x|+ |y|+ ( ∫ |v|2 dξ(v))1/2)
|Ft(x, y, z, ξ)| ≤ Lf
(
1 + |x|+ |y|+ |z|+ ( ∫ |v|2 dξ(v))1/2)
|G(x, µ)| ≤ Lf
(
1 + |x|+ ( ∫ |v|2 dµ(v))1/2) .
(B2’) The functions B,F and G satisfy the linear growth conditions
|Bt(x, y, ξ)| ≤ Lf
(
1 + |y|+ ( ∫ |v|2 dν(v))1/2)
|Ft(x, y, z, ξ)| ≤ Lf
(
1 + |y|+ |z|+ ( ∫ |v|2 dν(v))1/2)
|G(x, µ)| ≤ Lf
where ν is the second marginal of ξ.
Remark 11. Under the conditions (B1)-(B2) and (A5), it can be checked (see e.g. [57, Remark 2.1]) that the
functions 
(x, y, z) 7→ (Bt(x1, y1, LN(x, y)), . . . , Bt(xN , yN , LN(x, y)))
(x, y, z) 7→ (Ft(x1, y1, LN(x, y)), . . . , Ft(xN , yN , LN(x, y)))
x 7→ (G(x1, LN(x)), . . . , G(xN , LN(x)))
are Lipschitz continuous and of linear growth (with Lipschitz constant independent of N). Thus, the unique
solvability of the system (35) when the time horizon T is small enough is guaranteed e.g. by [28]. Existence of
a unique solution on arbitrary large time intervals typically requires additional conditions, for instance, if one
additionally assumes (B2’), see [28; 59] or under monotonicity-type conditions on the drift and the generator,
see [62].
The main result of this section is the following:
Theorem 12. Assume that the conditions (B1)-(B2), (A5) are satisfied, that the FBSDE (35) admits a solution
(X,Y , Z) and that the McKean-Vlasov FBSDE
(37)

Xt = x
1
0 +
∫ t
0
Bu(Xu, Yu,L(Xu, Yu)) du+ σWt
Yt = G(XT ,L(XT )) +
∫ T
t
Fu(Xu, Yu, Zu,L(Xu, Yu)) du−
∫ T
t
Zu dWu
admits a unique solution (X,Y, Z) ∈ S2(Rℓ)×S2(Rq)×H2(Rq×d). If there is k > 2 such that E[|x10|k] <∞, then
it holds that
(38) sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
W22
(
LN(Xt, Y t),L(Xt, Yt)
)] ≤ C (rN,q+ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k) for all (t, N) ∈ [0, T ]× N,
where rN,q+ℓ,k := rN,q+ℓ,k,2 is given by (5), and for some constants C depending on Lf , k, σ, E[|x10|k] and T .
Remark 13. The well posedness of the McKean-Vlasov FBSDE (37) is a well understood question, at least for
equations with Lipschitz continuous coefficients considered here. See for instance [17; 18; 19; 27; 26] and the
references therein. It is showed in [17, Theorem 2.1] and [20, Theorem 4.29] that the conditions (B1), (B2)
and (A5) guarantee existence of a solution for every T > 0. Uniqueness on arbitrarily large time is more subtle,
see e.g. [17, Section 2.6] and the discussion in [26, Section 5.1]. As showed for instance in [19, Theorem 5.1]
and [26, Section 5.2] uniqueness can be obtained when the generator is of a specific form (for instance equations
coming from control problems) or under additional monotonicity and/or convexity conditions similar to Lasry and
Lions monotonicity condition, see [56]. We further refer the interested reader to [8] for a thorough discussion on
uniqueness of (general) McKean-Vlasov FBSDEs.
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4.1. Proof of Theorem 12. The arguments of the proof of Theorem 12 are broken up into intermediate results
that we present in this subsection. Given a progressive d-dimensional process γ, we use the shorthand notation
Es,t(γ ·W ) for the stochastic exponential of γ. That is, we put
Es,t(γ ·W ) := exp
(∫ t
s
γu dWu − 1
2
∫ t
s
|γu|2 du
)
.
In this whole subsection, we assume that (37) admits a unique solution denoted by (X,Y, Z). We start by proving
useful moment bounds for solutions of McKean-Vlasov FBSDEs.
Lemma 14. Assume that the condition (B2) is satisfied and that (37) admits a unique solution (X,Y, Z). If
there is k ≥ 2 such that E[|x10|k] <∞, then there is a constant c(Lf ) depending only on Lf such that if T < c(Lf )
then it holds that
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xt|k
]
+ sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[|Yt|k] <∞.
Proof. Let us first look at the forward process. To alleviate notation, put x = x10. It follows by direct estimation
that
|Xt| ≤ |x|+
∫ t
0
|Bu(Xu, Yu,L(Xu, Yu))| du + |σ||Wt|.(39)
Thus, by the linear growth of B we have
E
[
( sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xt|)k
]
≤ CE[|WT |k] + c(Lf )
∫ T
0
(
E
[
sup
s∈[0,u]
|Xs|k
]
+ E[|Yu|k]
)
du+ CT + CE[|x|k]
where we used Doob’s maximal inequality, Jensen’s inequality and Fubini’s theorem. Thus, by Gronwall’s in-
equality it then follows
(40) E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xt|k
]
≤ c(Lf )
(
1 + E
[ ∫ T
0
|Yu|k du
])
.
For the backward equation, notice that by the mean-value theorem we can write
Yt = G(XT ,L(XT )) +
∫ T
t
[∫ 1
0
∂zFu(Xu, Yu, λZu,L(Xu, Yu)) dλZu + Fu(Xu, Yu, 0,L(Xu, Yu))
]
du
−
∫ T
t
Zu dWu
= EQ
[
G(XT ,L(XT )) +
∫ T
t
Fu(Xu, Yu, 0,L(Xu, Yu)) du | Ft
]
where we used Girsanov’s theorem, with Q the probability measure absolutely continuous with respect to P and
with density dQ/dP = E0,T (γ ·W ) with
γu :=
∫ 1
0
∂zFu(Xu, Yu, λZu,L(Xu, Yu)) dλ.
Since F is Lipschitz continuous, the derivative ∂zF can be defined almost everywhere. Therefore, by the linear
growth assumption and Jensen’s inequality, we have
|Yt|k ≤ c(Lf )
(
1 + |XT |k + E[|XT |k] + EQ
[ ∫ T
t
(
1 + |Xu|k + E[|Xu|k] + E[|Yu|k] + |Yu|k
)
du | Ft
])
.
Using Gronwall’s inequality, and (40) yields
|Yt|k ≤ c(Lf )
(
E[|XT |k] + 1 +
∫ T
0
E[|Yu|k] du
)
.
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Thus, choosing T small enough yields
E[|Yt|k] ≤ C.
Plugging this in (40) concludes the proof. 
The proof of Theorem 12 is based on the coupling technique used in [57]. To this end, we fix (X˜1, Y˜ 1, Z˜1), . . . ,
(X˜N , Y˜ N , Z˜N ), N i.i.d. copies of (X,Y, Z) such that for each i, (X˜ i, Y˜ i, Z˜i) solves the equation
(41)

X˜ it = x
i
0 +
∫ t
0
Bu(X˜
i
u, Y˜
i
u,L(Xu, Yu)) du + σW it
Y˜ it = G(X˜
i
T ,L(XT )) +
∫ T
t
Fu(X˜
i
u, Y˜
i
u, Z˜
i
u,L(Xu, Yu)) du−
∫ T
t
Z˜iu dW
i
u.
This can be done since the McKean-Vlasov FBSDE (37) is assumed to have a unique solution, and thus the
associated law L(Xu, Yu) is unique at each time u ∈ [0, T ]. The following lemma is a central element of our
argument. Recall the notation X˜ := (X˜1, . . . , X˜N) and Y˜ := (Y˜ 1, . . . , Y˜ N ).
Lemma 15. If (B1)-(B2) are satisfied, then there are positive constants C and c(Lf ) depending only on Lf
such that if T ≤ c(Lf ), then for every 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T it holds that
E
[W22 (L(Xt, Yt), LN(Xt, Y t))] ≤ CE[W22 (L(Xt, Yt), LN(X˜t, Y˜ t)) +W22 (L(XT ), LN (X˜T ))
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
|X˜ is −X i,Ns |2
]
.(42)
Proof. Applying Itoˆ’s formula to the process ebt|Y˜ it − Y i,Nt |2 for some b ≥ 0 to be determined later, we have
ebt|Y˜ it − Y i,Nt |2 = ebT |G(X˜ iT ,L(XT ))−G(X i,NT , LN (XT ))|2
− 2
N∑
k=1
∫ T
t
ebu(Y˜ iu − Y i,Nu )(δk,iZ˜iu − Zi,k,Nu )dW ku
+ 2
∫ T
t
ebu(Y˜ iu − Y i,Nu )
[
Fu(X˜
i
u, Y˜
i
u, Z˜
i
u,L(Xu, Yu))− Fu(X i,Nu , Y i,Nu , Zi,i,Nu , LN (Xu, Y u))
]
du
−
N∑
j,k=1
∫ T
t
(Zi,j,Nu − δijZiu)(Zi,k,Nu − δikZiu)d〈W j ,W k〉u −
∫ T
t
bebu|Y˜ iu − Y i,Nu |2du.
By Lipschitz continuity of F and G, then applying Young’s inequality with a strictly positive constant a to be
set below we get
ebt|Y˜ it − Y i,Nt |2 ≤ 2ebTLf |X˜ iT −X i,NT |2 + 2ebTLfW22 (L(XT ), LN(XT ))
− 2
N∑
k=1
∫ T
t
ebu(Y˜ iu − Y i,Nu )(δk,iZ˜iu − Zi,k,Nu )dW ku +
∫ T
t
ebuLf |X˜ iu −X i,Nu |2du
+
∫ T
t
ebu (Lfa+ 4Lf − b) |Y˜ iu − Y i,Nu |2du
−
N∑
j,k=1
∫ T
t
(Zi,j,Nu − δij Z˜iu)(Zi,k,Nu − δikZ˜iu)d〈W j ,W k〉u(43)
+ Lf
∫ T
t
ebuW22 (LN (Xu, Y u),L(Xu, Yu)) du +
Lf
a
∫ T
t
ebu|Z˜iu − Zi,i,Nu |2du.
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Letting a > Lf and b = Lfa+4Lf , and taking conditional expectation on both sides above, we have the estimate
|Y˜ it − Y i,Nt |2 ≤ 2ebTLfE
[
|X˜ iT −X i,NT |2 +W22 (LN (XT ),L(XT ))
+
∫ T
t
(
|X˜ iu −X i,Nu |2 +W22 (LN(Xu, Y u),L(Xu, Yu))
)
du | FNt
]
.(44)
On the other hand, for every 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T , by Lipschitz continuity of B, the forward equation yields the estimate
|X˜ it −X i,Nt | ≤ Lf
∫ t
s
(
|X˜ iu −X i,Nu |+ |Y˜ iu − Y i,Nu |+W2(LN (Xu, Y u),L(Xu, Yu))
)
du+ |X˜ is −X i,Ns |.(45)
Adding up the squared power of the above with (44) yields
|X˜ it −X i,Nt |2 + |Y˜ it − Y i,Nt |2 ≤ 2Lf(ebT + 1)E
[
W22 (LN (XT ),L(XT ))
+
∫ T
s
(
|X˜ iu −X i,Nu |2 + |Y˜ iu − Y i,Nu |2 +W22 (LN (Xu, Y u),L(Xu, Yu))
)
du | FNt
]
+ 2|X˜ is −X i,Ns |2.
If T < 1 ∧ 12Lf (eb+1) , we then have
E
[|X˜ it −X i,Nt |2 + |Y˜ it − Y i,Nt |2] ≤ c1(Lf )E[W22 (LN(XT ),L(XT )) + ∫ T
s
W22 (LN (Xu, Y u),L(Xu, Yu)) du
]
+ c1(Lf )E|X˜ is −X i,Ns |2
for a constant c1(Lf) which depends only on Lf . Coming back to the forward equation, it follows by the definition
of the 2-Wasserstein distance, by (45) and by Gronwall’s inequality that
W22 (LN (X˜T ), LN (XT )) ≤
1
N
N∑
i=1
|X˜ iT −X i,NT |2
≤ e2Lf
∫ T
s
( 1
N
N∑
i=1
|Y˜ iu − Y i,Nu |2 +W22 (LN(Xu, Y u),L(Xu, Yu))
)
du+ 2e2Lf
1
N
N∑
i=1
|X˜ is −X i,Ns |2.
Therefore, we can continue the estimation of |X˜ it −X i,Nt |2 + |Y˜ it − Y i,Nt |2 by
E
[|X˜ it −X i,Nt |2 + |Y˜ it − Y i,Nt |2] ≤ c1(Lf )E[W22 (LN (X˜T ),L(XT )) +W22 (LN (X˜T ), LN(XT ))
+
∫ T
s
W22 (LN (Xu, Y u),L(Xu, Yu)) du
]
+ 2e2LfE|X˜ is −X i,Ns |2
≤ c1(Lf ) ∨ 2e2LfE
[
W22 (L(XT ), LN (X˜T )) + |X˜ is −X i,Ns |2 +
1
N
N∑
i=1
|X˜ is −X i,Ns |2
+
∫ T
s
( 1
N
N∑
i=1
|Y˜ iu − Y i,Nu |2 +W22 (LN (Xu, Y u),L(Xu, Yu))
)
du
]
.(46)
Thus, further assuming T ≤ 1
c1(Lf )∨e
Lf
yields
E
[
W22 (LN (Xt, Y t), LN(X˜t, Y˜ t))
]
≤ E
[ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(|X˜ it −X i,Nt |2 + |Y˜ it − Y i,Nt |2)
]
≤ c2(Lf )E
[
W22 (L(XT ), LN (X˜T )) +
∫ T
s
W22 (LN (Xu, Y u),L(Xu, Yu)) du +
1
N
N∑
i=1
|X˜ is −X i,Ns |2
]
.
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By the triangle inequality we can therefore deduce that
EW22 (LN (Xt, Y t),L(Xt, Yt))
≤ EW22 (LN(X˜t, Y˜ t),L(Xt, Yt)) + EW22 (LN (X˜t, Y˜ t), LN (Xt, Y t))
≤ EW22 (LN(X˜t, Y˜ t),L(Xt, Yt))
+ c2(Lf )E
[
W22 (L(XT ), LN(X˜T )) +
∫ T
s
W22 (LN(Xu, Y u),L(Xu, Yu)) du+
1
N
N∑
i=1
|X˜ is −X i,Ns |2
]
from which we derive (42), assuming T < 1/c2(Lf). 
Proof. (of Theorem 12) The bound (38) follows by Lemmas 15 and 14. In fact, from Lemma 15 if T is small
enough that T < c(Lf), then for every t ∈ [0, T ] it holds that
E
[
W22 (LN (Xt, Y t),L(Xt, Yt))
]
≤ CE
[
W22 (LN(X˜t, Y˜ t),L(Xt, Yt))
]
+ CE
[
W22 (LN (X˜T ),L(XT ))
]
+ CE
[ 1
N
N∑
i=1
|X˜ is −XN,is |2
]
≤ C(rN,m+ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k) + CE
[ 1
N
N∑
i=1
|X˜ is −XN,is |2
]
where the second inequality follows by [35, Theorem 1] which can be applied thanks to Lemma 14. Taking s = 0
concludes the argument.
When T is arbitrary, consider a subdivision {0 = t0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tn = T } of the interval [0, T ] such that for
each m, tm+1 − tm ≤ c(Lf ). On each interval [tm−1, tm], arguing as above we have
E
[
W22 (LN (Xt, Y t),L(Xt, Yt))
]
≤ C(rN,m+ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k) + CE
[ 1
N
N∑
i=1
|X˜ itm−1 −XN,itm−1 |2
]
, t ∈ [tm−1, tm].(47)
By (45), for each m = 1, . . . , n we have
E
[ 1
N
N∑
i=1
|X˜ itm −X i,Ntm |2
]
≤ e2Lf
∫ tm
tm−1
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
|Y˜ iu − Y i,Nu |2 +W22 (LN (Xu, Y u),L(Xu, Yu))
)
du
+ E
[ 1
N
N∑
i=1
|X˜ itm−1 −X i,Ntm−1 |2
]
.(48)
On the other hand, notice that using the computations leading to (46) and the fact that tm−tm−1 is small enough
we have
sup
u∈[tm−1,tm]
E
[ 1
N
N∑
i=1
|Y˜ iu − Y i,Nu |2
]
≤ CE
[
W22 (L(Xtm), LN(X˜tm)) +
1
N
N∑
i=1
|X˜ itm−1 −X i,Ntm−1 |2
+
∫ tm
tm−1
W22 (LN (Xu, Y u),L(Xu, Yu))
)
du
]
,
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showing that
E
[ 1
N
N∑
i=1
|X˜ itm −X i,Ntm |2
]
≤ CE
[ 1
N
N∑
i=1
|X˜ itm−1 −X i,Ntm−1 |2 +W22 (L(Xtm), LN (X˜tm))
+
∫ tm
tm−1
W22 (LN (Xu, Y u),L(Xu, Yu)) du
]
≤ CE
[ 1
N
N∑
i=1
|X˜ itm−1 −X i,Ntm−1 |2
]
+ C(rN,q+ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k).
It thus follows by induction that
E
[ 1
N
N∑
i=1
|X˜ itm −X i,Ntm |2
]
≤ CkE
[ 1
N
N∑
i=1
|X˜ i0 −X i,N0 |2
]
+ (
k∑
e=1
Ce)(rN,q+ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k)
≤ (
k∑
e=1
Ce)(rN,m+ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k).(49)
Hence, for every t ∈ [0, T ] we finally have
E
[
W22 (LN (Xt, Y t),L(Xt, Yt))
]
≤
n−1∑
j=0
sup
t∈[tj ,tj+1]
E
[W22 (LN(Xt, Y t),L(Xt, Yt))]
≤ (
n∑
e=1
Ce + C)
(
rN,m+ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k
)
where we used (47) and (49). This concludes the proof of (38). 
Theorem 16. Assume that the conditions (B1)-(B2) and (A5) are satisfied and that the McKean-Vlasov
FBSDE (37) admits a unique solution (X,Y, Z) = (X1, Y 1, Z1) ∈ S2(Rℓ)×S2(Rq)×H2(Rq×d). If there is k > 2
such that E[|x10|k] <∞, then it holds that
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|X1,Nt −X1t |2
]
+ E
[
|Y 1,Nt − Y 1t |2
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
|Z1,1,Ns − Z1s |2 ds
]
≤ C
(
rN,q+ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k
)
(50)
for all N ∈ N.
Proof. By assumption (B1) and Gronwall’s inequality we readily have
(51) |X1,Nt −X1t | ≤ eLfT
∫ t
s
(|Y 1,Nu − Y 1u |+W2(LN (Xu, Y u),L(Xu, Yu))) du+ eLfT |X1,Ns −X1s |
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for all 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T . On the other hand, by Itoˆ’s formula applied to the process |Y 1,Nt − Y 1t |2 as in the proof of
Lemma 15, and then Young’s inequality with the constant a := 2Lf , we have
|Y 1,Nt − Y 1t |2 +
N∑
j,k=1
∫ T
t
(Z1,j,Ns − δ1jZ1s )(Z1,k,Ns − δ1kZ1s )d〈W j ,W k〉s
≤ Lf
(
|X1,NT −X1T |2 +W22 (LN (XT ),L(XT ))
)
− 2
N∑
k=1
∫ T
t
(Y 1,Ns − Y 1s )(Z1,k,Ns − δk,1Z1s )dW ks
+
∫ T
t
(
1
2
|Z1,Ns − Z1s |2 + |X1,Ns −X1s |2
)
ds+
∫ T
t
(3L2f + Lf)|Y 1,Ns − Y 1s |2ds
+
∫ T
t
LfW22 (LN (Xs, Y s),L(Xs, Ys)) ds.(52)
Thus, it follows that
|Y 1,Nt − Y 1t |2 ≤ c(Lf)E
[
W22 (LN (XT ),L(XT )) + sup
u∈[s,T ]
|X1,Nu −X1u|2
+
∫ T
t
|Y 1,Nu − Y 1u |2du+
∫ T
t
W22 (LN (Xu, Y u),L(Xu, Yu)) du | FNt
]
≤ c(Lf)E
[
W22 (LN (XT ),L(XT )) +
∫ T
s
W22 (LN (Xu, Y u),L(Xu, Yu)) du
+
∫ T
s
|Y 1,Nu − Y 1u |2 du | FNt
]
+ c(Lf )|X1,Ns −X1s |2,
where the second inequality follows by (51) and c(Lf ) is a constant depending only on Lf . If T is small enough,
then we have
sup
t∈[s,T ]
E[|Y 1,Nt − Y 1t |2] ≤ CE
[
W22 (LN(XT ),L(XT )) +
∫ T
0
W22 (LN (Xu, Y u),L(Xu, Yu)) du + |X1,Ns −X1s |2
]
≤ C(rN,q+ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k + E|X1,Ns −X1s |2)
where the last inequality follows from Theorem 12, and where we also used that
(53) W22 (LN (XT ),L(XT )) ≤ W22 (LN (XT , Y T ),L(XT , YT )).
Using (51) leads to
E
[
sup
t∈[s,T ]
|X1,Nt −X1t |2
]
≤ C(rN,q+ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k + E|X1,Ns −X1s |2).
When T is arbitrarily large we argue exactly as in the proof of Theorem 12 to obtain
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|X1,Nt −X1t |2
]
+ E[|Y 1,Nt − Y 1t |2] ≤ C
(
rN,q+ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k
)
.
Furthermore, by (52) and (51) we have
E
[ ∫ T
0
|Z1,1,Nt − Z1t |2 dt
]
≤ CE
[
W22 (LN (XT ),L(XT )) + sup
u∈[0,T ]
|X1,Nu −X1u|2 +
∫ T
0
|Y 1,Nt − Y 1t |2 dt
+
∫ T
0
W22 (LN(Xt, Y t),L(Xt, Yt)) dt
]
≤ CT (rN,q+ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k).
This concludes the proof. 
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Remark 17. A close observation of the proofs of Theorems 12 and 16 suggests that the assumption of uniqueness
of solution of the McKean-Vlasov FBSDE can be replaced by uniqueness of the law of the solution, because this is
enough to carry out the coupling argument in Lemma 15. Since uniqueness in law of FBSDEs is not well-studied,
we state our results with the stronger condition.
4.2. Concentration estimates. We conclude this section with some deviation and dimension-free concentration
estimates to strengthen the above convergence results.
Theorem 18. Assume that the conditions (B1)-(B2) and (A5) are satisfied and that the McKean-Vlasov
FBSDE (37) admits a unique solution (X,Y, Z) ∈ S2(Rℓ) × S2(Rq) × H2(Rq×d). Then we have the following
concentration estimations:
(1) If there is k > 4 such that E[|x10|k] <∞, then for every ε ∈ (0,∞), N ≥ 1 it holds that
(54) sup
t∈[0,T ]
P
(W22 (LN (Xt, Y t),L(Xt, Yt)) ≥ ε) ≤ C(aN, ε2 1{ε<2} + bN,k, ε2 + 2ε (rN,q+ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k))
for some constant C which does not depend on N, ε, with bN,k,ε := N(Nε)
−(k−ε)/2 and
aN,ε :=

exp(−cNε2) if q + ℓ < 4
exp(−cN(ε/ log(2 + 1/ε))2) if q + ℓ = 4
exp(−cNε(q+ℓ)/2) if q + ℓ > 4
for two positive constants C and c depending only on Lf , T , σ, k and E[|x10|k].
(2) There is a constant c(Lf ) > 0 such that if T < c(Lf ), then denoting by µ
N the N -fold product of the law
L(X,Y ) of (X,Y ), it holds that
(55) µN
(
H −
∫
H dµN ≥ ε
)
≤ e−Kε2
for every 1-Lipschitz continuous function H ∈ C([0, T ],Rℓ+q)N for some constant K depending on Lf , T
and σ, but not on (N, ℓ, q, d). If (B2) is replaced by (B2’), then (55) holds for all T > 0.
Let us start by the following lemma which gives a Talagrand T2 inequality for the law of the solution of a
foward-backward SDE. Note that this result is not covered by [5] since here, the system is fully coupled.
Lemma 19. Let m1,m2 ∈ N and let f : [0, T ] × Rm1 × Rm2 × Rm2×d → Rm2 , b : [0, T ] × Rm1 × Rm2 → Rm1
and g : Rm1 → Rm2 be such that f(t, ·, ·, ·), b(t, ·, ·) and g are three Lf -Lipschitz continuous uniformly in t and
σ ∈ Rm1×d a matrix satisfying (A5). Then there is a constant c(Lf) > 0 depending only on Lf such that if
T ≤ c(Lf), then the FBSDE
(56)

Xt = x+
∫ t
0
bu(Xu, Yu) du + σWt
Yt = g(XT ) +
∫ T
t
fu(Xu, Yu, Zu) du−
∫ T
t
Zu dWu
admits a unique square integrable solution (X,Y, Z), such that X and Y have almost surely continuous paths and
(57) the law L(X,Y ) of (X,Y ) satisfies T2(Cx,y)
for some constant Cx,y (explicitly given in the proof) depending only on Lf , T and σ, but which does not depend
on m1,m2 and d. That is,
W2(L(X,Y ), Q) ≤
√
Cx,yH(Q|L(X,Y )) for all Q ∈ P2(C([0, T ],Rm1+m2))
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where H is the Kullback-Leibler divergence defined2, for any two probability measures Q1 and Q2 as
H(Q2|Q1) :=
{
EQ2 [log(
dQ2
dQ1
)] if Q2 ≪ Q1
+∞ else.
If one additionally assumes
(B2”) |g(x)| ≤ Lf , |ft(x, y, z)| ≤ Lf(1 + |y|+ |z|) and |bt(x, y)| ≤ Lf(1 + |y|) for all t, x, y, z,
then (57) holds for every T > 0.
Proof. This lemma follows from a combination of results in [31]. First notice that the continuity of the paths
of (X,Y ) is clear. In addition, there is a deterministic Lv-Lipschitz continuous, v : [0, T ] × Rm1 → Rm2 such
that Y s,xt = v(t,X
s,x
t ) P -a.s., where (X
s,x, Y s,x, Zs,x) is the solution of (56) with Xs,xs = x. We justify below
that v is Lv-Lipschitz continuous and the constant Lv does not depend on (m1,m2, d). But see already that as a
consequence, the process X satisfies the SDE
Xt = x+
∫ t
0
b˜(u,Xu) du+ σWt
where the drift b˜(t, x) := b(t, x, v(t, x)) is LfLv-Lipschitz continuous with respect to the second variable. Thus
it follows by [60, Theorem 5] (which extends the original work of [31]) that the law L(X) of X satisfies T2(C1)
with C1 = 4|σ|2Te4T (L2fL2vT+1). Therefore, by [31, Lemma 2.1], we can now deduce that the law L(X,Y ) satisfies
T2(Cx,y) with Cx,y := C1(1 + Lv)
2. In particular, Cx,y does not depend on m1,m2 and d.
To conclude the proof, it remains to justify that Lv does not depend on the dimension. If T ≤ c(Lf ) is
sufficiently small, then this follows by [28, Corollary 1.4]. If T is arbitrary and the condition (B2”) is satisfied, then
this follows from (the proof of) [51, Theorem 2.5]. There, it is actually shown that Lv ≡ K5 :=
√
2L2f + LfTe
LfT .

Proof. (of Theorem 18) By triangular inequality, we have
P
(W22 (L(Xt, Yt), LN (Xt, Y t)) ≥ ε) ≤ P (W22 (L(Xt, Yt), LN (X˜t, Y˜ t)) ≥ ε/2)
+ P
( 1
N
N∑
i=1
|X˜ it −X i,Nt |2 + |Y˜ it − Y i,Nt |2 ≥ ε/2
)
.(58)
The first term on the right hand side is estimated as follows:
P
(
W22 (L(Xt, Yt), LN (X˜t, Y˜ t)) ≥ ε/2
)
≤ C(aN, ε
2
1{ε<2} + bN,k, ε
2
).
This follows by [35, Theorem 2] since, by Lemma 14, the processes Y and X have moments of order k > 4. On
the other hand, by Markov’s inequality, we have
P
( 1
N
N∑
i=1
|X˜ it −X i,Nt |2 + |Y˜ it − Y i,Nt |2 ≥ ε/2
)
≤ 2
ε
1
N
N∑
i=1
E|X˜ it −X i,Nt |2 + E|Y˜ it − Y i,Nt |2
≤ C
(
rN,q+ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k
)
,
where the second inequality follows by Theorem (16). Combine this with (58) to get (54).
2We use the convention E[X] := +∞ whenever E[X+] = +∞.
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Let us now turn to the proof of (55). Recall that the i.i.d. copies (X˜1, Y˜ 1, Z˜1), . . . , (X˜N , Y˜ N , Z˜N), of (X,Y, Z)
solve the FBSDE (41). Thus, they satisfy the equation
(59)

X˜ it = x
i
0 +
∫ t
0
bu(X˜
i
u, Y˜
i
u) du + σW
i
t
Y˜ it = g(X˜
i
T ) +
∫ T
t
fu(X˜
i
u, Y˜
i
u, Z˜
i
u) du −
∫ T
t
Z˜iu dW
i
u
with the Lf -Lipschitz-continuous functions bt, ft and g being defined respectively as g(x) := G(x,L(XT )),
ft(x, y, z) := Ft(x, y, x,L(Xt, Yt)) and bt(x, y) := Bt(x, y,L(Xt, Yt)). Therefore, it follows by Lemma 19 that
the law L(X i, Y i) = L(X,Y ) satisfies T2(C). Thus, by [43, Theorem 1.3] we obtain (55). 
5. Approximation of the mean field game and mean field control
This section of the paper is dedicated to the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 stated in Section 2. We will also state
and prove analogous convergence results for cooperative games. We start by the proof of the convergence of Nash
equilibria.
5.1. Proof of Theorem 1. In this section we provide the proof of the convergence of the Nash-equilibrium of
the N -player game with interaction through state and control to the extended mean-field game. The proof relies
on the Pontryagin maximum principles derived in Section 3, along with the propagation of chaos type results of
the previous section.
The idea of the convergence is to generalize the argument presented in Section 3 in the case of linear quadratic
games to the case where we do not have access to explicit formulas representing the equilibrium. Recall notation
of Sections 2 and 3 and the solution (Y i,j , Zi,j,k)i,j,k=1,...,N of the adjoint equation of the game given in Equation
(14). The next two auxiliary results show that the off-diagonal elements of Y i,j converge to zero.
Lemma 20. If the conditions (A1)-(A5) are satisfied, then the solution (Y i,j , Zi,j,k)i,j,k=1,...,N of the adjoint
equation (14) along with the processes X i,αˆ satisfy
E
[
1
N
N∑
k=1
|X i,αˆt |
]
≤ Ct
and
E
[
|Y i,jt |2 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
|X i,αˆt |2 +
N∑
k=1
∫ T
0
|Zi,j,kt |2 dt
]
≤ C
for two constants Ct, C > 0 which do not depend on i, j, N .
Proof. This follows from the fact that the functions b, ∂µb, ∂xf and ∂ξf are of linear growth, and the function
∂xb is bounded (see conditions (A1) and (A4)). In fact, recalling that the adjoint equation is given by (17)-(18),
these properties imply
(60) |X i,αˆt |2 ≤ C
(
|xi0|2 +
∫ t
0
(
1 + |X i,αˆu |2 + |αˆiu|2 +
1
N
N∑
k=1
(|Xk,αˆu |2 + |αˆku|2)
)
du+ |σ|2|W it |2
)
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and
E
[
|Y i,jt |2
]
≤ δi,jC
(
1 + E
[
|X i,αˆT |2
]
+
1
N
∑
k
E
[
|Xk,αˆT |2
])(61)
+ C
1
N
(
1 + E
[
|X i,αˆT |2
]
+ E
[
|Xj,αˆT |2
]
+
1
N
∑
k
E
[
|Xk,αˆT |2
])
+ CE
[ ∫ T
t
(
|X i,αˆu |2 + |Xj,αˆu |2 + |αˆiu|2 + |Y i,ju |2 +
1
N
N∑
k=1
(|Xk,αˆu |2 + |αˆku|2 + |Y i,ku |2)
)
du+ 1
]
.
Taking the average over i in (60), taking the expectation, and then applying Gronwall’s inequality leads to
E
[
1
N
N∑
k=1
|Xk,αˆt |2
]
≤ C
(
1 + E[|xi0|2] + E
[∫ T
0
1
N
N∑
k=1
|αˆku|2 du
]
+ E[|σ|2|W it |2]
)
≤ C
(
1 + E[|xi0|2] +
1
N
N∑
k=1
‖αˆk‖2H2(Rm) + E[|σ|2|W it |2]
)
< C,
where we used the fact that the set of admissible controls is bounded in H2(Rm). Plugging this back in (60) and
using again Gronwall’s inequality shows that
(62) E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|X i,αˆt |
]
< C,
with C a constant independent of N .
Similarly, recalling the expression of Y i,jT given in (17), it follows from Gronwall’s inequality applied to (61)
that
E
 1
N
∑
j
|Y i,jt |2
 ≤ 1
N
C
(
1 + E
[
|X i,αˆT |2
]
+
1
N
∑
k
E
[
|Xk,αˆT |2
])
+ CE
[ ∫ T
t
(
|X i,αˆu |2 + |αˆiu|2 +
1
N
N∑
k=1
(|Xk,αˆu |2 + |αˆku|2)
)
du+ 1
]
.
Thus, in view of (62) and the admissibility condition on αˆ, it follows that the right-hand side in the last
inequality is bounded by a positive constant. Plugging this in (61) and using again (62), Gronwall’s inequality
and the admissibility of αˆ allows to conclude that
E
[
|Y i,jt |2
]
< C,
with C a constant independent of N . This concludes the proof. 
Lemma 21. If the conditions (A1)-(A5) are satisfied, then for every i, j such that i 6= j, and every t ∈ [0, T ],
we have
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Y i,jt |2
]
≤ CN−1
for every N ≥ 1 and some positive constant C > 0.
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Proof. Let i be fixed. For every j such that i 6= j, the process Y i,j satisfies the equation
dY i,jt = −
(
1
N
∂µf
(
t,X
i,αˆ
t , αˆ
i
t, L
N(X
αˆ
t , αˆt)
)
(X
j,αˆ
t )
)
dt
−
(
∂xb
(
t,X
j,αˆ
t , αˆ
j
t , L
N (X
αˆ
t , αˆt)
)
Y i,jt +
N∑
m=1
1
N
∂µb
(
t,X
m,αˆ
t , αˆ
m
t , L
N(X
αˆ
t , αˆt)
)
(X
j,αˆ
t )Y
i,m
t
)
dt
+
N∑
k=1
Zi,j,kdW kt
with
(63) Y i,jT =
1
N
∂µg
(
X
i,αˆ
T , L
N (X
αˆ
T )
)
(X
j,αˆ
T ).
We assume for simplicity that i = 1, and in an effort to write the equations in a more compact form, we define
the vectors
Y −1 := (Y 1,2, . . . , Y 1,N ), At :=
(
∂µf
(
t,X
1,αˆ
t , αˆ
1
t , L
N (X
αˆ
t , αˆt)
)
(X
j,αˆ
t )
)
j=2,...,N
,
as well as
Bt :=
(
∂µb
(
t,X
1,αˆ
t , αˆ
1
t , L
N(X
αˆ
t , αˆt)
)
(X
j,αˆ
t )
)
j=2,...,N
,
and
Cjt :=
(
∂µb
(
t,X
m,αˆ
t , αˆ
m
t , L
N(X
αˆ
t , αˆt)
)
(X
j,αˆ
t )
)
m=2,...,N
and the matrix
Dt := diag
(
∂xb
(
t,X
j,αˆ
t , αˆ
j
t , L
N(X
αˆ
t , αˆt)
))
j=2,...,N
.
With this new set of notation, the vector Y −1 satisfies the multidimensional BSDE
dY −1t = −
(
1
N
(At +BtY
1,1
t ) +
1
N
〈Y −1t , Ct〉+DtY −1t
)
dt+
N∑
k=1
Z1,−1,kt dW
k
t
with terminal condition (63) and with Z1,−1,k := (Z1,2,k, . . . , Z1,N,k), where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product on
RN−1. Thus, by square integrability of Z1,−1,k, it follows that
Y −1t = E
[
Y −1T +
∫ T
t
(
1
N
(As +BsY
1,1
s ) +
1
N
〈Y −1s , Cs〉+DsY −1s
)
ds | FNt
]
.
Denoting by | · |2 the Euclidean norm on RN−1, we obtain
|Y −1t |2 ≤ E
[
|Y −1T |2 +
∫ T
t
1
N
(|As|2 + |Bs|2|Y 1,1s |)+ 1N |Y −1s |2|Cs|2 + |Y −1s |2|Ds|2 ds | FNt
]
.
Therefore, it follows by Gronwall’s inequality that
|Y −1t |2 ≤ CE
[
|Y −1T |2 +
∫ T
t
1
N
(|As|2 + |Bs|2|Y 1,1s |) ds | FNt
]
(64)
for a constant C depending on T and the Lipschitz constant of b, but not on N . In fact, by Lipschitz continuity
of b the processes B,C and D are bounded by the Lipschitz constant of b. Moreover, since ∂µf is of linear
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growth (see assumption (A4)), it follows by Lemma 20 that the process (At) is square integrable. It satisfies
supN E
[ ∫ T
0 |At|2 dt
]
<∞. In addition, it follows again by Lemma 20 that
E
[|Y −1T |22] ≤ 1N2E[
N∑
j=2
|∂µg(X1,αˆT , LN(X αˆT ))(Xj,αˆT )|2
]
≤ CN − 1
N2
E
[
|X i,αˆT |2 +
1
N
N∑
k=1
|Xk,αˆT |2 + 1
]
+
C
N
E
[ 1
N
N∑
j=2
|Xj,αˆT |2
]
≤ C 1
N
where the last inequality follows by Lemma 20. Combine this with (64), Doob’s maximal inequality, square
integrability of (At) and boundedness of (Bt) to obtain
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Y −1t |22
]
≤ C2E
[
|Y −1T |22 +
∫ T
0
1
N2
(|As|22 + |Bs|22|Y 1,1s |2) ds
]
≤ C/N + C˜/N2
for some constant C˜ depending on T , the bounds of A,B and the second moment of Y 1,1s (which is bounded in
N). Therefore, we have
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Y 1,jt |2
]
≤ E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Y −1t |22
]
≤ C 1
N
for some constant C > 0. 
Let us give a representation of the minimizer of the Hamiltonian.
Lemma 22. Assume that condition (A2) holds. Let Λ : [0, T ]× Rℓ × Rm × P2(Rℓ)× Rm → Rm be such that
(65) ∂af1
(
t, x,Λ(t, x, y, µ, χ), µ
)
+ ∂ab1
(
t, x,Λ(t, x, y, µ, χ), µ
)
y = χ.
Then Λ minimizes the Hamiltonian H, is Lipschitz continuous in (x, y, µ, χ) (with Lipschitz constant given by
that of the function H defined in condition (A3)) and satisfies the linear growth property
(66) |Λ(t, x, y, µ, χ)| ≤ C
(
1 + |x|+ |y|+ |χ|+ ( ∫
Rℓ
|v|2µ(dv))1/2).
Proof. This lemma is probably well-known but since we could not find a suitable reference, we provide the
proof here for the sake of completeness. By convexity and differentiability of the Hamiltonian (see (A3)), a vector
α = Λ(t, x, y, µ, χ) ∈ Rm satisfying (65) minimizes the function H˜1(t, x, a, µ, y) := f1(t, x, a, µ)+b1(t, x, a, µ)y−χa
in a.
Let us show that Λ is Lipschitz continuous. Let (x, y, µ, χ), (x′, y′, µ′, χ′) be fixed and put α′ := Λ(t, x′, y′, µ′, χ′).
By the condition (A3), we have
γ|α− α′|2 ≤ H(t, x, y, α, µ)−H(t, x, y, α′, µ)− (α− α′)∂aH(t, x, y, α, µ)
= H˜1(t, x, y, α, µ)− H˜1(t, x, y, α′, µ)− (α− α′)∂aH˜1(t, x, y, α, µ)
and
γ|α− α′|2 ≤ H˜1(t, x′, y′, α′, ξ′)− H˜1(t, x′, y′, α, µ′)− (α′ − α)∂aH˜1(t, x′, y′, α′, µ′).
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Summing up these two inequalities yields
2γ|α− α′|2 ≤
∫ 1
0
∂aH˜1(t, x, y, uα+ (1− u)α′, µ) du(α− α′)
+
∫ 1
0
∂aH˜1(t, x
′, y′, uα+ (1 − u)α′, µ′) du(α− α′)
− (α− α′)(∂aH˜1(t, x, y, α, µ)− ∂aH˜1(t, x′, y′, α′, µ′))
≤ C|α− α′|(|x− x′|+ |y − y′|+W2(µ, µ′))
for some constant C > 0 where we used Lipschitz continuity of ∂aH˜1 = ∂aH assumed in (A3). Therefore, we get
|α− α′| ≤ C(|x− x′|+ |y − y′|+ |χ− χ′|+W2(µ, µ′)),
which shows that Λ is Lipschitz continuous, therefore measurable.
It remains to show the growth property. Using again (A3), we have
γ|α|2 ≤ H(t, x, y, 0, ξ)−H(t, x, y, α, ξ) + α∂aH(t, x, y, 0, µ)
≤ α
∫ 1
0
∂aH(t, x, y, uα, µ) du+ α∂aH(t, x, y, 0, µ)
≤ C|α|
(
1 + |x|+ |y|+ ( ∫ |v|2µ(dv))1/2)
for some constant C where we used the linear growth condition on ∂aH . Therefore, we have (66). 
We now come to the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof. (of Theorem 1) Let αˆ be a Nash equilibrium for the N -player game. By Theorem 6, the process αˆ satisfies
∂αiH
N,i(t,Xt, αˆt, Y
i,·
t ) = 0 for every i = 1, . . . , N . Unpacking this condition gives
∂αf1
(
t,X
i,αˆ
t , αˆ
i
t, L
N (X
αˆ
t )
)
+ ∂αb1(t,X
i,αˆ
t , αˆ
i
t, L
N(X
αˆ
t ))Y
i,i
t
1
N
∂νf2(t,X
i,αˆ
t , L
N(X
αˆ
t , αˆt))(αˆ
i
t) +
1
N
N∑
k=1
∂νb2(t,X
i,αˆ
t , L
N(X
αˆ
t , αˆt))(αˆ
k
t )Y
i,k
t = 0.(67)
This is due to the decompositions b = b1 + b2 and f = f1 + f2 and the fact that the functions b2 and f2 do not
depend on αˆi. By Lemma 22, there is a Lipschitz continuous function Λ such that
(68) αˆit = Λ
(
t,X
i,αˆ
t , Y
i,i
t , L
N(X
αˆ
t ), ζ
N
t
)
whereby
ζNt := −
1
N
∂νf2(t,X
i,αˆ
t , L
N(X
αˆ
t , αˆt))(αˆ
i
t)−
1
N
N∑
k=1
∂νb2(t,X
i,αˆ
t , L
N(X
αˆ
t , αˆt))(αˆ
k
t )Y
i,k
t
and Λ not depending on N and i, j but only depending on ∂αf1 and ∂αb1. This shows that when αˆ is a Nash
equilibrium, then the optimal state X i ≡ X i,αˆ along with the processes (Y i,j , Zi,j,k) satisfy the fully coupled
system of FBSDEs (recall (14))
dX
i,αˆ
t = b(t,X
i,αˆ
t , αˆ
i
t, L
N (X
αˆ
t , αˆt)) dt+ σ dW
i
t
dY i,it = −
{
∂xf(t,X
i,αˆ
t , αˆ
i
t, L
N (X
αˆ
t , αˆt)) + ∂xb(t,X
i,αˆ
t , αˆ
i
t, L
N(X
αˆ
t , αˆt))Y
i,i
t + ǫ
N
t
}
dt+
∑N
k=1 Z
i,j,k
t dW
k
t
X
i,αˆ
0 ∼ µ(0), αˆit = Λ
(
t,X
i,αˆ
t , Y
i,i
t , L
N(X
αˆ
t ), ζ
N
t
)
, Y i,iT = ∂xg(X
i,αˆ
T , L
N(X
αˆ
T )) + γ
N
with
ǫNt :=
1
N
∂µf(t,X
i,αˆ
t , αˆ
i
t, L
N(X
αˆ
t , αˆt))(X
i,αˆ
t ) +
1
N
N∑
j=1
∂µb(t,X
j,αˆ
t , αˆ
j
t , L
N (X
αˆ
t , αˆt))(X
i,αˆ
t )Y
i,j
t
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and
γN :=
1
N
∂µg(X
i,αˆ
T , L
N(X
αˆ
T ))(X
i,αˆ
T ).
Unfortunately, we cannot directly apply the propagation of chaos results for FBSDE developed in the previous
section to the above equation. For this reason, we introduce the following auxiliary equation:
(69)

dX˜ i,Nt = b(t, X˜
i,N
t , α˜
i,N
t , L
N (X˜t, α˜t)) dt+ σ dW
i
t
dY˜ i,Nt = −
{
∂xf
(
t, X˜ i,Nt , α˜
i,N
t , L
N (X˜t)
)
+ ∂xb(t, X˜
i,N
t , α˜
i,N
t , L
N(X˜t))Y˜
i
t
}
dt+
∑N
k=1 Z˜
i,k,N
t dW
k
t ,
X˜ i,N0 ∼ µ(0), Y˜ i,NT = ∂xig(X˜ i,NT , LN (X˜T )), α˜i,Nt = Λ
(
t, X˜ i,Nt , Y˜
i,N
t , L
N(X˜t), 0
)
and further define the function ϕ : [0, T ]× P2(Rℓ × Rℓ)→ P2(Rℓ × Rm) given by
ϕ(t, ξ) := ξ ◦ (idℓ,Λ(t, ·, ·, µ, 0))−1
where idℓ is the projection on R
ℓ and µ the first marginal of ξ, so that (idℓ,Λ(t, ·, ·, µ, 0)) : Rℓ × Rℓ → Rℓ × Rm.
Then, equation (69) can be re-written as
(70)

dX˜ i,Nt = B(t, X˜
i,N
t , Y˜
i,N
t , L
N (X˜t, Y˜ t)) + σ dW
i
t
dY˜ i,Nt = −F (t, X˜ i,Nt , Y˜ i,Nt , LN(X˜t, Y˜ t)) +
∑N
k=1 Z˜
i,k,N
t dW
k
t
X˜ i,N0 ∼ µ(0), Y˜ i,NT = G(X˜ i,NT , LN(X˜T ))
with
B(t, x, y, ξ) := b
(
t, x,Λ(t, x, y, µ, 0), ϕ(t, ξ)
)
F (t, x, y, ξ) := ∂xf
(
t, x,Λ(t, x, y, µ, 0), ϕ(t, ξ)
)
+ ∂xb
(
t, x,Λ(t, x, y, µ, 0), ϕ(t, ξ)
)
y
where µ is the first marginal of ξ and
G(x, µ) = ∂xg(x, µ).
Let us now justify that the functions B, F and G satisfy the conditions of Theorem 16. By assumptions (A1),
(A3) and Lipschitz continuity of Λ, in order to prove Lipschitz continuity of B,F,G it suffices to show that for
every ξ, ξ′ ∈ P2(Rℓ × Rℓ) it holds
W2(ϕ(t, ξ), ϕ(t, ξ′)) ≤ C(W2(ξ, ξ′) +W2(µ, µ′))
where µ, µ′ are the first marginals of ξ and ξ′, respectively. In fact, using Kantorovich duality theorem, see [65,
Theorem 5.10] that
W22 (ϕ(t, ξ), ϕ(t, ξ′)) = sup
( ∫
Rℓ×Rm
h1(x, y)ϕ(t, ξ)(dx, dy) −
∫
Rℓ×Rm
h2(x
′, y′)ϕ(t, ξ′)(dx′, dy′)
)
= sup
( ∫
Rℓ×Rℓ
h1(x,Λ(t, x, y, µ))ξ(dx, dy) −
∫
Rℓ×Rℓ
h2(x
′,Λ(t, x′, y′, µ′))ξ′(dx′, dy′)
)
with the supremum over the set of bounded continuous functions h1, h2 : R
ℓ × Rm → R such that h1(x, y) −
h2(x
′, y′) ≤ |x − x′|2 + |y − y′|2 for every (x, y), (x′, y′) ∈ Rℓ × Rm, which, by Lipschitz continuity of Λ implies
that h1(x,Λ(t, x, y, µ)) − h2(x′,Λ(t, x′, y′, µ′)) ≤ |x − x′|2 + |Λ2(t, x, y, µ) − Λ2(t, x′, y′, µ′)| ≤ C(|x − x′|2 + |y −
y′|2 +W22 (µ, µ′)). This shows that
W2(ϕ(t, ξ), ϕ(t, ξ)) ≤ sup
(∫
Rl×Rl
h˜1(x, y)ξ(dx, dy) −
∫
Rl×Rl
h˜2(x
′, y′)ξ′(dx′, dy′)
)
with the supremum over functions h˜1, h˜2 such that h˜1(x, y) − h˜2(x′, y′) ≤ C(|x − x′|2 + |y − y′|2 +W22 (µ, µ′)).
Hence, applying Kantorovich duality once again yields
W2(ϕ(t, ξ), ϕ(t, ξ)) ≤ C inf
∫∫
|x− x′|2 + |y − y′|2 +W2(µ, µ′) dπ
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with the infimum over probability measures π with first and second marginals π1 = ξ and π2 = ξ
′. This yields
the result by definition of W2(ξ, ξ′). Therefore, B,F and G are Lipschitz continuous.
That B,F and G are of linear growth follows by (A3) and Lemma 22. Therefore, B,F and G satisfy (B1)-(B2)
with a constant Lf which does not depend on N .
Thus, if the McKean-Vlasov FBSDE
(71)

dXt = B(t,Xt, Yt,L(Xt, Yt)) dt+ σ dW it
dYt = −F (t,Xt, Yt,L(Xt, Yt)) dt+ Zt dW it
X0 ∼ µ0, YT = ∂xg(XT , µXT )
admits a unique solution (X,Y, Z) ∈ S2(Rℓ)× S2(Rℓ) ×H2(Rℓ×d), then it follows from Theorem 16 that for all
N ∈ N we have
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xt − X˜ i,Nt |2
]
+ E
[
|Yt − Y˜ i,Nt |2
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
|Zs − Z˜i,i,Ns |2 ds
]
≤ C(rN,m+ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k)
for some constant C > 0 which does not depend on N , and where rN,ℓ,k is defined in (5). On the other hand,
using Lipschitz continuity (and definitions) of B,F and G, it can be checked using standard FBSDE estimates
that
(72) E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|X it − X˜ i,Nt |2
]
+ E
[
|Y i,it − Y˜ i,Nt |2
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
|Zi,i,it − Z˜i,i,Nt |2 dt
]
≤ CE[KN ]
with
KN := |γN |2 +
∫ T
0
|εNt |2 + |ζNt |2 dt
for a constant C that does not depend on N . Therefore, we obtain by triangular inequality that
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|X i,αˆt −Xt|2
]
+ E
[
|Y i,it − Yt|2
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
|Zi,i,it − Zt|2 dt
]
≤ C(E[KN ] + rN,m+ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k).(73)
Let us check that KN converges to zero in expectation. It follows directly from Lemma 20 and Proposition 21
that supt |εNt | converges to zero in L2. Since ∂µg is of linear growth, see assumption (A4) we have
E
[|γN |2] ≤ 1
N2
E
[|∂µg(X iT , LN(XαT ))(XjT )|2]
≤ C
N2
E
[
1 + |X i,αT |2 + |Xj,αT |2 +
1
N
∑
j=1
|Xj,αˆT |2
]
≤ C/N2,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 20. Using linear growth of ∂µf and boundedness of ∂νb we similarly
obtain
(74) E[|ζNt |2] ≤
C
N2
E
[
1 + |X i,αˆt |+ |αˆit|2 +
1
N
N∑
j=1
|Xj,αˆt |2 + |αˆjt |2
]
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
E[|Y i,jt |2] ≤ C/N2
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 20 and Proposition 21. By convergence to zero of the second
moments of εN , δN and γN , it holds that E[KN ]→ 0.
Now, put αˆt := Λ(t,Xt, Yt,L(Xt), 0). For ease of notation, we will omit the zero in the last component and
simply write
(75) αˆt := Λ(t,Xt, Yt,L(Xt)).
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By Lipschitz continuity of Λ, it follows that
E[|αˆit − αˆt|2] = E
[
|Λ(t,X i,αˆt , Y it , LN(X αˆt ), ζNt )− Λ(t,Xt, Yt,L(Xt))|2
]
≤ CE
[
|X i,αˆt −Xt|2 + |Y i,it − Yt|2 +W2(LN (X αˆt ),L(Xt)) + |ζNt |2
]
≤ C(rN,m+ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k + E[KN ]).(76)
Therefore, there is N large enough such that for every i and t we have
E[|αˆit − αˆt|2] ≤ C(rN,m+ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k).
It remains to justify that (71) admits a unique solution, and that αˆ is indeed the mean field equilibrium. We
start by the former claim. Observe that by [17, Theorem 2.1], (71) admits a solution, and that this solution is
unique follows by uniqueness of the mean field equilibria and Proposition 7. Next, we apply again Proposition
7 to justify that αˆ is the mean field equilibrium, thus we first show that the mapping t 7→ L(Xt, αˆt) is bounded
and Borel measurable. The Borel measurability follows by Lipschitz continuity of Λ since by definition of the
Wasserstein distance it holds that
W2(L(Xt, αˆt),L(Xs, αˆs)) ≤ E
[|Xt −Xs|2 + |αˆt − αˆs|2]
≤ CE[|Xt −Xs|2 + |Yt − Ys|2]
for all s, t ∈ [0, T ]. The boundedness of the second moment follows by Lemma 22 and square integrability of
solutions of the McKean-Vlasov equation (recall Lemma 14). In fact, we have
sup
t
E[|Xt|2 + |αˆt|2] ≤ C(1 + sup
t
E[|Xt|2 + |Yt|2]) ≤ C,
which proves the claim. Now, notice that, written in terms of b, f and g, the McKean-Vlasov system (71) reads
(77)

dXt = b
(
t,Xt, αˆt,L(Xt, αˆt)
)
+ σ dW it
dYt = −∂xf
(
t,Xt, αˆt,L(Xt, αˆt)
)
+ ∂xb(t,Xt, αˆt,L(Xt, αˆt))Yt dt+ Zt dW it
X0 ∼ µ0, YT = ∂xg(XT ,L(XT )), αˆt = Λ(t,Xt, Yt,L(Xt)).
This is the adjoint equation 20 associated to the mean field game. Since the functions x 7→ g(x, µ) and (x, a) 7→
H(t,Xt, a,L(Xt, αˆt), Yt) := f(t, x, a,L(Xt, αˆt)) + b(t, x, a,L(Xt, αˆt))y are P ⊗ dt-a.s. convex, and by Lemma 22
the process αˆt satisfies
H(t,Xt, αˆt, Yt,L(Xt, αˆt)) = inf
a∈A
H(t,Xt, a, Yt,L(Xt, αˆt)).
Thus, it follows from Pontryagin’s stochastic maximum principle, see Proposition 7 that αˆ is a mean field equi-
librium. This concludes the proof. 
Corollary 23. Let conditions (A1)-(A5) be satisfied and assume that there is k > 2 such that µ(0) admits
moments of oder k. If the N -player game admits a Nash equilibrium αˆN ∈ AN and if the FBSDE 77 with
Λ therein given by Lemma 22 admits a unique square integrable solutions, then for each i, the sequence (αˆi,N )
converges to αˆ in H2(Rm), αˆ is a mean field equilibrium and it holds that
E[|αˆi,Nt − αˆt|2] ≤ C(rN,m+ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k)
for all N ∈ N large enough and some constant C > 0.
Proof. The proof is exactly the same, except that the uniqueness of the FBSDE (77) does not follow from that
of the mean field equilibrium. 
Remark 24. Notice that the purpose of the decomposition (2) assumed on the drift b and the cost function f is to
guarantee that a Nash equilibrium αˆi admits an “explicit” representation of the form αˆit = Λ(t,X
i,αˆ
t , Y
i,i
t , L
N (X
αˆ
t ), ζ
N
t )
where, even thought the process ζN still depends on αˆ, it converges to zero. If such a representation can be ensured
by other means, then the decomposition (2) is not needed.
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5.2. Proof of Theorem 2. The proof is based on the representation (68) and the concentration inequalities
proved in Section 4.2.
To show that we show the moment bound, we consider the solution (X˜, Y˜ , Z˜) = (X˜ i,N , Y˜ i,N , Z˜i,j,N ) of the
auxiliary FBSDE (70) introduced in the proof of Theorem 1 and put
α˜i,Nt := Λ(t, X˜
i,N
t , Y˜
i,N
t , L
N (X˜t)).
Then by the representation (75) of the mean field equilibrium, we have L(αt) = ψ(t,L(Xt, Yt)), where ψ is the
function given by
ψ(t, ξ) = ξ ◦ Λ(t, ·, ·, ξ1)−1
for all ξ ∈ P2(Rℓ ×Rℓ) with ξ1 the first marginal of ξ. Similarly, we have LN(α˜t) = ψ(t, LN (X˜t, Y˜ t)). As argued
in the proof of Theorem 1, the function ψ is Lipschitz continuous for the 2-Wasserstein metric, as a consequence
of Lipschitz continuity of Λ. Therefore, we have
E
[W2(LN (αˆt),L(αˆt))] ≤ E[W2(LN (αˆt), LN (α˜t))]+ E[W2(LN (α˜t),L(αˆt))]
≤ E
[( 1
N
N∑
i=1
|X i,Nt − X˜ i,Nt |2 + |Y i,i,Nt − Y˜ i,Nt |2 + |ζNt |2
)1/2]
+ E
[W2(ψ(t, LN (X˜t, Y˜ t)), ψ(t,L(Xt, Yt)))]
≤ CE[KN + |ζNt |2]1/2 + CE
[W2(LN(X˜t, Y˜ t),L(Xt, Yt))].
It was showed in the proof of Theorem 1 that E[KN + |ζNt |2] ≤ CN−2, and since the coefficients B,F and G
of the FBSDE (70) are Lipschitz continuous, it follows from Theorem 12 that E
[W2(LN(X˜t, Y˜ t),L(Xt, Yt))] ≤
C (rN,2ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k) for all (t, N) ∈ [0, T ]× N. Therefore, we get
(78) E
[W2(LN (αˆt),L(αˆt))] ≤ C(N−1 + rN,2ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k).
We now turn to the proof of the deviation inequality . Let h : RmN → R be a 1-Lipschitz function and put
h˜(x, y) := h
(
Λ(xi, yi,i, LN(x), 0)i=1,...,N
)
.
Consider again the solution (X˜, Y˜ , Z˜) = (X˜ i,N , Y˜ i,N , Z˜i,j,N ) of the auxiliary FBSDE (70) introduced in the proof
of Theorem 1. Then, we have by (68), Lipschitz continuity of Λ and Chebyshev’s inequality that
P
(
h(αˆt)− E[h(αˆt)] ≥ a
)
≤ P
(
h(αˆt)− h˜(X˜t, Y˜ t) ≥ a/3
)
+ P
(
E[h˜(X˜t, Y˜ t)− h(αˆt)] ≥ a/3
)
+ P
(
h˜(X˜t, Ŷ t)− E[h˜(X˜t, Y˜ t)] ≥ a/3
)
≤ C
a2
N∑
i=1
E
[
|X i,αˆt − X˜ i,Nt |2 + |Y i,i,αˆt − Y˜ i,Nt |2 + |ζNt |2
]
+ P
(
h˜(X˜t, Y˜ t)− E[h˜(X˜t, Y˜ t)] ≥ a/3
)
≤ C
a2
NE
[
KN + |ζNt |2
]
+ P
(
h˜(X˜t, Y˜ t)− E[h˜(X˜t, Y˜ t)] ≥ a/3
)
.
We showed in the proof of Theorem 1 that E[KN + |ζNt |2] ≤ CN−2. It now remains to estimate the last term on
the right hand side above. This is done using arguments similar to those put forth in the proof of [57, Theorem
7]. In fact, on the probability space (ΩN ,FN , P ), consider the following compact form of the FBSDE (70):{
X˜t = x+
∫ t
0
B(u, X˜u, Y˜ u) du+ΣW t
Y˜ t = G(X˜T ) +
∫ T
t
F (u, X˜u, Y˜ u) du−
∫ T
t
Z˜u dWu
where we put
B(t, x, y) := (B(t, xi, yi, LN(x, y)))i=1,...,N
CONVERGENCE OF LARGE POPULATION GAMES TO MFGS WITH INTERACTION THROUGH THE CONTROLS 39
and similarly define F and G, and we put Σ := diag(σ) and Z := diag(Zi,·, . . . , ZN,·). Then, by Lemma 19, the
law L(X̂, Ŷ ) satisfies Talagrand’s T2(Cx,y) inequality with Cx,y = C(LF , T, |σ|) given in (the proof of) Lemma
19. Note in passing that the Lipschitz constant LF of B,F ,G does not depend on N . Therefore, it follows from
[43, Theorem 1.3] that there is a constant K depending on Cx,y and the Lipschitz constant of h˜ such that
P
(
h˜(X˜t, Y˜ t)− E[H(X˜t, Y˜ t)] ≥ a/3
)
≤ e−Ka2 .
The bound P (|αˆi,Nt | − E[|αˆi,N |] ≥ a) ≤ 2e−Ka
2
follows by taking h to be the absolute value of the projection on
the i-th component and N ≥ 1aeKa
2
.
To get (7), first notice that the function x 7→ √NW2(LN(x),L(αˆt)) is 1-Lipschitz. Thus, we have
P
(W2(LN (αˆt),L(αˆt))) ≤ P (√NW2(LN (αˆt),L(αˆt))−√NE[W2(LN(αˆt),L(αˆt))] ≥ √Na/2)
+ P
(
E
[W2(LN(αˆt),L(αˆt))] ≥ a/2)
≤ C
a2N2
+ e−KNa
2
+ P
(
E
[W2(LN(αˆt),L(αˆt))] ≥ a/2).
By (78), choosing N large enough the last term on the right hand side vanishes. This concludes the proof for T
small enough.
Under the additional condition (8), the functions B,F and G satisfy (B2’), thus the proof of the case T
arbitrary is the same, in view of the second part of Lemma 19. 
5.3. Cooperative N-player games and Mckean-Vlasov control. In this section we briefly consider the case
of optimal control of Mckean-Vlasov dynamics with mean field interactions through the distribution of controls.
More precisely, we consider the control of McKean-Vlasov dynamics
(79) V := inf
α∈A
E
[ ∫ T
0
f(t,Xαt , αt,L(Xαt , αt)) dt+ g(XαT ,L(XαT ))
]
with
dXαt = b(t,X
α
t , αt,L(Xαt , αt)) dt+ σ dWt, Xα0 ∼ µ(0).
This problem is commonly seen as the N →∞ limit of the N -state control problem
(80) V N := inf
α∈AN
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[ ∫ T
0
f(t,X
i,α
t , α
i
t, L
N(X
α
t , αt)) dt+ g
(
X
i,α
T , L
N(X
α
T )
)]
with
(81) dX
i,α
t = b(t,X
i,α
t , α
i
t,L(Xαt , αt)) dt+ σ dWt, X i,α0 ∼ µ(0),
where the X
i,α
0 , i = 1, . . . , N, are i.i.d. (81) is the minimization of the ”social cost” by the N cooperative players.
5.3.1. Limit theorem. The following theorem gives conditions under which this connection can be made precise.
Just as in the case of competitive N -player games discussed in the previous section, the limit theorem here again
is a consequence of the general forward-backward propagation of chaos. We consider the conditions below, where
we define
(82) HN (t, x, α, y) :=
N∑
i=1
[
f
(
t, xi, αi, LN (x, α)
)
+ b
(
t, xi, αi, LN (x, α)
)
yi
]
.
(A6) The system of N equations
∂αH
N (t, x, α, y) = 0
admits a solution αˆ = (αˆ1, . . . , αˆN ), where αˆit = Λ(t, x
i, yi, LN (x, y)) for a function Λ : [0, T ]× Rℓ × Rℓ ×
P2(Rℓ×Rℓ)→ A ⊆ Rm that is Lipschitz continuous in its last three components uniformly in t. Moreover,
the function HN is convex in α.
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(A7) The function
F : (t, x, y, ξ) 7→∂xf(t, x,Λ(t, x, y, ξ), ϕ(t, ξ)) + ∂xb(t, x,Λ(t, x, y, ξ), ϕ(t, ξ))y
+
∫
∂µf(t, u, v,Λ(t, u, v, ξ), ϕ(t, ξ))(x)ξ(du, dv)
+
∫
∂µb(t, u, v,Λ(t, u, v, ξ), ϕ(t, ξ))(x)yξ(du, dv)
mapping [0, T ] × Rℓ × Rℓ × P2(Rℓ × Rℓ) to Rℓ is Lipschitz continuous uniformly in t ∈ [0, T ], where
ϕ : [0, T ]× P2(Rℓ × Rℓ)→ P2(Rℓ × Rm) is given by
ϕ(t, ξ) := ξ ◦ (idℓ,Λ(t, ·, ·, ξ, 0))−1
with idℓ being the projection on R
ℓ and µ the first marginal of ξ.
(A8) The functions g and
(83) H(t, x, α, y, ξ) := f(t, x, α, ξ) + b(t, x, α, ξ)y.
are convex in the sense that
g(x, µ)− g(x′, µ′) ≤ ∂xg(x, µ)(x − x′) + E˜
[
∂µg(x, µ)(X˜)(X˜ − X˜ ′)
]
,
with µ, µ′ ∈ P(Rℓ) and X,X ′ random variables such that µ = L(X), µ′ = L(X ′), and
H(t, x′, a′, y, ξ′) ≥ H(t, x, a, y, ξ) + ∂xH(t, x, y, ξ)(x′ − x) + ∂αH(t, x, a, y, ξ)(a′ − a)
+ E˜
[
∂µH(t, x, a, y, ξ)(X˜)(X˜
′ − X˜) + ∂νH(t, x, a, y, ξ)(α˜)(α˜′ − α˜)
]
for all x, x′ ∈ Rℓ, a, a′ ∈ Rm, y ∈ Rℓ, ξ, ξ′ ∈ P2(Rℓ × Rm) and (X,α), (X ′, α′) such that ξ = L(X,α),
ξ′ = L(X,α).
(A9) The following FBSDE admits at most one solution:
(84)

dXt = b
(
t,Xt, αˆt,L(Xt, αˆt)
)
dt+ σdWt,
dYt = −F
(
t,Xt, Yt,L(Xt, Yt)
)
dt+ ZtdWt
X0 ∼ µ(0), YT = ∂xg(XT ,L(XT )) + E˜
[
∂µg(X˜T ,L(XT ))(XT )
]
, αˆt = Λ(t,Xt, Yt,L(Xt, Yt))
where E˜ means that the expectation is taken only on the random variables X˜t, ˜ˆαt, Y˜t, which are identical
copies of (Xt, αˆt, Yt).
Theorem 25. Assume that the conditions (A1) and (A5)-(A9) are satisfied, and that there is k > 2 such that
µ(0) has moments of order k. Let N ∈ N. If the cooperative game (80) admits a solution αˆ := (αˆi, . . . , αˆN ), then
for each i it holds
(85) E
[|αˆit − αˆt|2] ≤ C (rN,2ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k) for all t ∈ [0, T ],
for some constant C > 0 (independent of N), where αˆ is a solution of the McKean-Vlasov control problem (79).
Proof. Observe that (80) is an optimal control problem in dimension ℓ × N . An application of (standard)
stochastic Pontryagin maximum principle (see e.g. [20, Theorem 2.15]) yields the following: If αˆ is a minimizer
for the N -agent control problem (80), then it holds
(86) HˇN (t,X
αˆ
t , αˆt, Yˇ t) = inf
a∈AN
HˇN (t,X
αˆ
t , a, Yˇ t) P ⊗ dt-a.s.,
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where HˇN is the Hamiltonian given by
HˇN (t, x, α, yˇ) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
f
(
t, xi, αi, LN(x, α)
)
+
N∑
i=1
b
(
t, xi, αi, LN (x, α)
)
yˇi
=
1
N
HN(t, x, α,Nyˇ)
and (Yˇ i, Zˇi,k)i,k solves the adjoint equation
(87) dYˇ it = −∂xiHˇN (t,X αˆt , αˆt, Yˇ t)dt+
N∑
k=1
Zˇi,kt dW
k
t , Yˇ
i
T = ∂xi gˇ
N(X
αˆ
T )
with gˇN(x) := 1N
∑N
i=1 g(x
i, LN (x)) and Yˇ = (Yˇ 1, . . . , Yˇ N ). Let us introduce the processes Y αˆ,i = NYˇ i and
Zαˆ,i = NZˇi, as well as the rescaled Hamiltonian HN defined in (82).
Then the FBSDE system consisting of (81) and (87) can be written as
(88)

dX
αˆ,i
t = b(t,X
αˆ,i
t , αˆ
i
t, L
N (X
αˆ
t , αˆt)) dt+ σ dW
i
t
dY
αˆ,i
t = −∂xiHN (t,Xαˆt , αˆt, Y αˆt )dt+
N∑
k=1
Z
αˆ,i,k
t dW
k
t
X αˆ,i ∼ µ(0), Y αˆ,iT = ∂xg(X αˆ,iT , LN(X αˆT )) + 1N
∑N
j=1 ∂µg(X
αˆ,j
T , L
N(X
αˆ
T ))(X
αˆ,i
T )
where αˆ := (αˆi, . . . , αˆN ) satisfies the optimality condition (86) which in turn, due to convexity of HN and of the
set A, becomes
(89) ∂αH
N (t,X
αˆ
t , αˆt, Y
αˆ
t )(αˆt − βt) ≤ 0 P ⊗ dt-a.s.
By assumption (A6), we have αˆit = Λ(t,X
αˆ,i
t , Y
αˆ,i
t , L
N(X
αˆ
t , Y
αˆ
t )) for a function Λ which is Lipschitz continuous
in its last three arguments. Note that, for each i, the term ∂xiH
N is expressed as:
∂xiH
N(t, x, α, y) = ∂xf
(
t, xi, αi, LN (x, α)
)
+
1
N
N∑
j=1
∂µf
(
t, xj , αj , LN (x, α)
)
(xi)
+ ∂xb
(
t, xi, αi, LN(x, α)
)
yi +
1
N
N∑
j=1
∂µb
(
t, xj , αj , LN (x, α)
)
(xi)yj .(90)
A similar expression holds for the derivative ∂αiH
N , but with ∂α and ∂ν instead of ∂x and ∂µ respectively, and
the derivatives ∂ν being evaluated at α
i instead of xi for ∂µ. The key difference with the term ∂xiH
N,i appearing
in the (non-cooperative) game setting, is that here the influence of the terms ∂µf and ∂µb are not going to vanish
as N →∞.
Thus, plugging the expression αˆit = Λ
N(t,X
αˆ,i
t , Y
αˆ,i
t , L
N(X
αˆ
t , Y
αˆ
t )) in (91) yields
∂xiH
N (t,X
αˆ
t , αˆt, Y
αˆ
t ) = ∂xf
(
t,X
αˆ,i
t ,Λ(t,X
αˆ,i
t , Y
αˆ,i
t , L
N(X
αˆ
t , Y
αˆ
t )), ϕ(t, L
N (X
αˆ
t , Y t))
)
+
1
N
N∑
j=1
∂µf
(
t,X
αˆ,j
t ,Λ(t,X
αˆ,j
t , Y
αˆ,j
t , L
N(X
αˆ
t , Y
αˆ
t )), ϕ(t, L
N (X
αˆ
t , Y
αˆ
t ))
)
(X
αˆ,i
t )
+ ∂xb
(
t,X it ,Λ(t,X
αˆ,i
t , Y
i
t , L
N (X
αˆ
t , Y
αˆ
t )), ϕ(t, L
N (X
αˆ
t , Y
αˆ
t ))
)
Y
αˆ,i
t
+
1
N
N∑
j=1
∂µb
(
t,X
αˆ,j
t ,Λ(t,X
αˆ,j
t , Y
αˆ,j
t , L
N(X
αˆ
t , Y
αˆ
t )), ϕ(t, L
N (X
αˆ
t , Y
αˆ
t ))
)
(X
αˆ,i
t )Y
αˆ,j
t
= F (t,X
αˆ,i
t , Y
αˆ,i
t , L
N(X
αˆ
t , Y
αˆ
t )).
(91)
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Observe that by assumption (A7) the function F is Lipschitz continuous (uniformly in t) on Rℓ×Rℓ×P2(Rℓ×Rℓ),
this is proved exactly as in the proof of Theorem 1. Let B and G be defined by
B : (t, x, y, ξ) 7→ b(t, x,Λ(t, x, y, ξ), ϕ(t, ξ))
G : (x, µ) 7→ g(x, µ) +
∫
∂µg(x
′, µ)(x)µ(dx′).
B and G are Lipschitz continuous since so are g and b by Assumption (A1), and moreover Λ and ϕ are also
Lipschitz continuous (see the proof of Theorem 1). Thus, by [20, Theorem 4.29] the following McKean-Vlasov
FBSDE admits a square integrable solution (X,Y, Z):
(92)

dXt = B(t,Xt, Yt,L(Xt, Yt)) dt+ σdWt
dYt = −F (t,Xt, Yt,L(Xt, Yt)) dt+ Zt dWt
X0 ∼ µ(0), YT = G(XT ,L(XT )).
We will justify below that this solution is unique. Thus, it follows by Theorem 16 that
E
[|X αˆ,it −Xt|2]+ E[|Y αˆ,it − Yt|2] ≤ C(rN,2ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k),
and by Theorem 12, it holds that
E
[
W22
(
LN (Xt, Y t),L(Xt, Yt)
)] ≤ C (rN,2ℓ,k + rN,ℓ,k) for all t ∈ [0, T ],
where C is independent ofN . In particular, putting αˆt := Λ(t,Xt, Yt,L(Xt, Yt)) the claim (85) follows by Lipschitz
continuity of Λ.
It remains to show that αˆ thus defined is a solution of the McKean-Vlasov control problem (79) and that the
solution of the FBSDE (92) is unique. Notice that the process αˆ is clearly admissible since (Xt, Yt) is adapted
and Λ takes values in A. Next, observe that using the definition of F and ϕ, the limiting McKean-Vlasov FBSDE
(92) can be re-written as (84).
On the other hand, since for each N the optimal control αˆ of the N -player game satisfies the optimality
condition (89), it follows that for each i = 1, . . . , N and each admissible control β one has
0 ≥ ∂αiHN (t,Xαˆt , αˆt, Y αˆt )(αˆit − βt)
=
[
∂αf
(
t,X
αˆ,i
t , αˆ
i
t, ϕ(L
N (X
αˆ
t , Y
αˆ
t ))
)
+
1
N
N∑
j=1
∂νf
(
t,X
αˆ,j
t , αˆ
j
t , ϕ(L
N (X
αˆ
t , Y
αˆ
t ))
)
(αˆit)
+ ∂αb
(
t,X
αˆ,i
t , αˆ
i
t, ϕ(L
N(X
αˆ
t , Y
αˆ
t ))
)
Y
αˆ,i
t +
1
N
N∑
j=1
∂νb
(
t,X
αˆ,j
t , αˆ
j
t , ϕ(L
N (X
αˆ
t , Y
αˆ
t ))
)
(αˆit)Y
αˆ,j
t
]
(αˆit − βt).
After possibly extracting a subsequence, we have X
αˆ,i
t → Xt, Y αˆ,it → Yt and LN (Xt, Y t) → L(Xt, Yt) in the
Wasserstein space (see Theorem 12) so that taking the limit as N →∞ on both sides above yields
(93)
(
∂αH(t,Xt, αˆt, Yt,L(Xt, αˆt)) + E˜
[
∂νH
(
t, X˜t, ˜ˆαt, Y˜t,L(Xt, αˆt)
)
(αˆt)
])
(αˆt − βt) ≤ 0.
Note that we used once again definition of ϕ to go from the law of (Xt, Yt) to that of (Xt, αˆt, and where H is
the function defined in (83). Since (93) is the optimality condition for the McKean-Vlasov control problem (79)
derived in [1], it follows by (A8) and [1, Theorem 3.5] that the process αˆ is a solution of the mean field control
problem (79).
To conclude, observe that equation (92) coincides with (84). Thus, uniqueness follows from assumption (A9).

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5.3.2. Cooperative linear-quadratic games. If we consider the LQ setting described in (21), then the Hamiltonian
HN defined by (82) rewrites
HN (t, x, α, y) :=
N∑
i=1
[ (
Q|xi|2 + Q¯|xN |2 +R|αi|2 + R¯|αN |2 + S¯xiαN)+ (Axi + A¯xN +Bαi + B¯αN) yi]
where we use the notation
xN :=
1
N
N∑
j=1
xj , αN :=
1
N
N∑
j=1
αj .
At the optimum αˆ (if it exists), the optimality condition (89) yields that for every i,
∂αiH
N (X
αˆ
t , αˆt, Y
αˆ
t ) = 0,
where (X αˆ, Y αˆ, Zαˆ) solve the N -player control FBSDE system (88) with controls αˆ. To alleviate the notation,
we will drop the superscript αˆ. The above optimality condition can be written as
0 = 2Rαˆit + 2R¯αˆ
N
t + S¯Xt
N
+BY it + B¯Yt
N
(94)
where
Xt
N
:=
1
N
N∑
j=1
Xjt , Yt
N
:=
1
N
N∑
j=1
Y jt .
Taking the average over i in (94) leads to
0 = 2(R+ R¯)αˆ
N
t + S¯Xt
N
+ (B + B¯)Yt
N
,
hence we have
αˆ
N
t = −
1
2(R+ R¯)
[
S¯Xt
N
+ (B + B¯)Yt
N
]
.(95)
Plugging this back in (94) yields
αˆit = −
1
2R
[
BY it + S¯
(
1− R¯
R+ R¯
)
Xt
N
+
(
B¯ − R¯
R+ R¯
(B + B¯)
)
Yt
N
]
.(96)
Then, the FBSDE system (88) can be written as
dX it =
[
AX it + A¯Xt
N
+Bαˆit + B¯αˆt
N
]
dt+ σ dW it
dY it = −
{
2QX it +
[
2Q¯− S¯
2
2(R+ R¯)
]
Xt
N
+AY it +
[
A¯− S¯(B + B¯)
2(R+ R¯)
]
Yt
N
}
dt+
N∑
k=1
Zi,kt dW
k
t .
On the other hand, for the problem of optimal control of MKV dynamics, the Hamiltonian defined by (83) is
given by
H(t, x, α, y, ξ) = f(t, x, α, ξ) + b(t, x, α, ξ)y
= Qx2 + Q¯
(∫
x′µ(dx′)
)2
+Rα2 + R¯
(∫
α′ν(dα′)
)2
+ S¯x
(∫
α′ν(dα′)
)
+
{
Ax + A¯
(∫
x′µ(dx′)
)
+Bα+ B¯
(∫
α′ν(dα′)
)}
y,
so that
∂αH(t, x, α, y, ξ) = 2Rα+By and ∂νH(t, x˜, α˜, y˜, ξ)(α) = 2R¯
(∫
α′ν(dα′)
)
+ S¯x˜+ B¯y˜.
44 MATHIEU LAURIE`RE & LUDOVIC TANGPI
Thus, the optimality condition (93) leads to
0 = ∂αH(t,X
αˆ
t , αˆt, Y
αˆ
t ,L(X αˆt , αˆt)) + E˜
[
∂νH
(
t, X˜ αˆt ,
˜ˆαt, Y˜
αˆ
t ,L(X αˆt , αˆt)
)
(αˆt)
]
= 2Rαˆt +BYt + 2R¯E[αˆt] + S¯E[Xt] + B¯E[Yt],
which implies (by taking the expectation)
E[αˆt] = − 1
2(R+ R¯)
(
S¯E[Xt] + (B + B¯)E[Yt]
)
.
This is the counterpart to (95). Plugging this back in the above optimality condition for αˆ yields
αˆt = − 1
2R
(
BYt + S¯
(
1− R¯
2(R+ R¯)
)
E[Xt] +
(
B¯ − R¯
2(R+ R¯)
(B + B¯)
)
E[Yt]
)
.
This is the counterpart to (96). Note that these formulas express αˆit (resp. αˆt) as a linear combination of
Y it , Yt
N
, Xt
N
(resp. Yt, Yt, Xt) and the coefficients of the linear combinations are exactly the same. More precisely,
in this case, the function Λ is explicitly given by:
Λ(t, x, y, ξ) = − 1
2R
{
By + S¯
(
1− R¯
2(R+ R¯)
)∫
R
x′µ(dx′) +
(
B¯ − R¯
2(R+ R¯)
(B + B¯)
)∫
R
y′ν(dy′)
}
,
where µ, ν are the marginals of ξ (in this particular setting, Λ depends only on the marginals). Hence the
convergence of the optimal control entirely boils down to the convergence of the FBSDE system, where the N -
player system has exactly the same coefficients as the MKV system (whereas in the case of MFG, some factors
1/N were present in the N -player FBSDE system). This type of remark has already been used e.g. in [24,
Subsection 2.3], motivated by applications to multi-agent reinforcement learning with interactions through the
control’s distribution.
6. Approximation of the master equation: proof of Theorem 5
This section is dedicated to the proof of the convergence of the solution of the finite dimensional PDE (10)
to the solution of the master equation (9). This will illustrate additional applications of our forward-backward
propagation of chaos derived in Section 4 beyond large population games. The proof can be read independently
of our investigation of convergence of Nash equilibria.
Proof. (of Theorem 5) We start by justifying well-posedness of the finite dimensional PDE (10). By assumption
(PDE), the function B is three times continuously differentiable in (x, y, ξ) ∈ Rd × Rq × P2(Rd × Rq). Thus
if follows by application of [20, Proposition 5.35] that the function (x, y) 7→ B(x1, y1, LN(x, y)) is two times
continuously differentiable. In particular,
∂xiB(x
1, y1, LN(x, y)) = δi,1∂xB(x
1, y1, LN (x, y)) +
1
N
∂ξB(x
1, y1, LN(x, y))(xi).
This allows to check that, since the (first order) derivatives of (x, y, ξ) 7→ B(x, y, ξ) are bounded, so are the
derivatives of (x, y) 7→ B(t, x1, y1, LN(x, y)) and the bound does not depend on N . Similarly, the projections
of the functions F and G on finite dimensional spaces (of appropriate dimensions) are two times continuously
differentiable with bounded derivatives. In addition, by assumption we have
|B(xi, yi, LN(x, y))| ≤ C(1 + |y|) and |F (xi, 0, LN(x, 0))| ≤ C.
Thus, it follows by [59, Proposition 3.3] that the PDE (10) admits a unique classical solution (v1,N , . . . , vN,N) :
[0, T ] × (Rd)N → RN with bounded first and second order derivatives. Moreover, by [59, Theorem 4.1], this
solution admits the probabilistic representation
vi,N (s,X1,N,t,x
1
s , . . . , X
N,N,t,xN
s ) = Y
i,N,t,x
s for all s ≥ t, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× (Rd)N
CONVERGENCE OF LARGE POPULATION GAMES TO MFGS WITH INTERACTION THROUGH THE CONTROLS 45
where (X i,N,t,x
1
, Y i,N,t,x, Zi,N,t,x) is the unique solution of the coupled system of FBSDEs
(97)

X i,N,t,x
i
s = x
i +
∫ s
t
B
(
X i,N,t,x
i
u , Y
i,N,t,x
u , Ln(X
t,x
u , Y
t,x
u )
)
du+
∫ s
t
σ dW iu
Y
i,N,t,x
s = G
(
X i,N,t,x
i
T , L
n(Xt,xT )
)
+
∫ T
s F
(
X i,N,t,x
i
u , Y
i,N,t,x
u , Z
i,N,t,x
u , LN (X
t,x
u , Y
t,x
u )
)
du
−∑Nj=1 ∫ Ts Zi,j,N,t,xu dW ju
i = 1, . . . , N
where, as usual, we put Xt,x := (X1,N,t,x
1
u , . . . , X
N,N,t,xN
u ) and Y
t,x := (Y
1,N,t,x
u , . . . , X
N,N,t,x
u ). This equation is
uniquely solvable by [59, Theorem 4.1].
Similarly, the more recent result of [26] shows that the solution of the master equation admits a probabilistic
representation. To this end, first notice that under the condition (PDE) the McKean-Vlasov FBSDE
(98)
{
Xt,χs = χ+
∫ s
t B
(
Xt,χu , Y
t,χ
u ,L(Xt,χu , Y t,χu )
)
du +
∫ s
t σ dW
1
u
Y t,χs = G
(
Xt,χT ,L(Xt,χT )
)
+
∫ T
s F
(
Xt,χu , Y
t,χ
u , Z
t,χ
u ,L(Xt,χu , Y t,χu )
)
du− ∫ Ts Zt,χu dW 1u
admits a unique solution (Xt,χ, Y t,χ, Zt,χ) for every t ∈ [0, T ] and χ ∈ L2(Ω, P,Ft) provided that T is bounded
by a constant depending on the Lipschitz constant LF , see e.g. [26; 17].
Since the condition (PDE) corresponds to (H2) in [26], it follows by [26, Theorem 2.7] that the master equation
admits a unique classical solution V : [0, T ]× Rd × P2(Rd)→ R and it holds that
V
(
s,Xt,χs ,L(Xt,χs )
)
= Y t,χs
where (Xt,χ, Y t,χ, Zt,χ) is the unique solution of the FBSDE (98). In particular, it holds V (t, χ, µ) = Y t,χt for all
(t, χ, µ) ∈ [0, T ]× L2(Ω,Ft, P ;Rd)× P2(Rd) with L(χ) = µ.
Since B is differentiable on P2(Rd), it follows by definition of ∂µB that for every µ, µ′ ∈ P2(Rd), one has
B(x, y, µ) −B(x, y, µ′) =
∫ 1
0
∫
Rd
∂µB(x, y, λµ+ (1− λ)µ′)(v)(µ − µ′)(dv)dλ.
Since v 7→ ∂µB(x, y, µ)(v) is LF -Lipschitz continuous, it follows by Kantorovich-Rubinstein formula that
|B(x, µ)−B(x, µ′)| ≤
∫ 1
0
LFW1(µ, µ′) dλ ≤ LFW2(µ, µ′).
That is, B is Lipschitz continuous. Similar arguments show that G and F are Lipschitz continuous as well. Let
χi, i = 1, . . . , N, be i.i.d. random variables in L2(Ω,Ft, P,Rd) with common law µ and denote χ := (χ1, . . . , χN ).
Thus we have
E
[|v1,N (t, χ1, . . . , χN )− V (t, χ1,L(χ1))|2] = E [|Y 1,N,t,χt − Y t,χ1t |2]
≤ C(rN,2d,k + rN,d,k)(99)
where the inequality follows from Theorem 16. 
Corollary 26. Assume that the condition (PDE) is in force and that ((A3)) is satisfied. If the McKean-Vlasov
FBSDE (98) admits a unique solution (Xt,χ, Y t,χ, Zt,χ) ∈ S2(Rd)× S2(Rq)×H2(Rq×d) such that
E
[
|Y t,χt − Y t,χ
′
t |2
]
≤ CE [|χ− χ′|2]
for some constant C > 0 and every t ∈ [0, T ], χ, χ′ ∈ L2(Ω, P,Ft), then the conclusions of Theorem 5 remain
valid.
Moreover, putting χ := (χ1, . . . , χN ), for every t ∈ [0, T ] we have
(100) E
[
|vi,N (t, χ1, . . . , χN )− V (t, χi, LN (χ))|2
]
≤ C(rN,2d,k + rN,d,k).
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Proof. The proof of this corollary is exactly the same as that of Theorem 5. Therein, to obtain the probabilistic
representation of the solution of the master equation, it suffices to apply [26, Proposition 5.2] instead of [26,
Theorem 2.6].
As to the second claim of the corollary, by [26, Proposition 5.2], the function V is Lipschitz continuous in its
last two components uniformly in the first one. Thus, using triangular inequality, we have
E
[
|vi,N (t, χ)− V (t, χi, LN (χ))|
]
≤ E
[
|vi,N (t, χ)− V (t, χi,L(χi))|
]
+ E
[
|V (t, χi,L(χi))− V (t, χi, LN(χ))|
]
≤ E
[
|vi,N (t, χ)− V (t, χi,L(χi))|
]
+ CE
[
W2(LN(χ),L(χi))
]
.
Since E[|χ|k] <∞, it follows by [35] that E
[
W2(LN (χ),L(χi))
]
≤ CrN,d,k. Thus, the result follows from (99). 
Remark 27. For relevant cases in the theory of mean field games and control under which the associated FBSDE
admits a unique global solutions, we refer to [26, Section 5.2] and [18, Section 3.3].
7. Summary and outlook
We have proposed in this paper a fully probabilistic approach to the convergence of some general large popula-
tion games to their mean field counterparts. Our approach is largely based on a new form of propagation of chaos
for “particle systems” evolving forward and backward in time. Such a propagation of chaos relied on Lipschitz
continuity properties of the equations defining the particle system (or analogously the coefficients of the control
problems). It would be interesting to understand to which extent these smoothness conditions can be weakened.
It seems that (at least from the perspective taken here) weakening these conditions would require substantial
progress in the theory of McKean-Vlasov backward SDEs in order to obtain the same results.
Another byproduct of the propagation of chaos results presented here is Theorem 5 on the convergence of the
solution vi,N of the parabolic PDE (10) written on the finite dimensional space [0, T ]×RdN to the solution V of
the PDE (9) written on the infinite dimensional space [0, T ]× Rd × P2(Rd). While this result is of independent
interest and is stated here without referring to large population asymptotics, combining it with the convergence of
αˆi,N and the Lipschitz continuity of V given by [26] could lead to a finer analysis of the convergence of αˆi,N to αˆ.
This can be done by mimicking a method carried out in [29], albeit in a different setting than ours. For the sake of
illustration, let us explain this point on the fundamental example of price impact introduced in Subsection 3.3.2.
With the notation of that section and choosing c(α) = |α|2/2, the Nash equilibrium αˆi satisfies αˆit = X it − Y i,it
with Y i,jT = δijg
′(X iT ) and{
dX it = (X
i
t − Y i,it ) dt+ σ dW it
dY i,jt = −δij
(
c′X(X
i
t )− 1N
∑N
k=1(X
k
t − Y k,kt )
)
dt+
∑N
k=1 Z
i,j,k
t dW
k
t .
Thus Y i,j = 0 = Zi,j,k for i 6= j, so we put Y i := Y i,i and Zi,k := Zi,i,k. By Theorem 16, it holds E[|X it −Xt|2+
|Y it − Yt|2]→ 0 with (X,Y, Z) solving{
dXt = (Xt − Yt) dt+ σ dWt
dYt = −(c′X(Xt)− E˜[X˜t − Y˜t]) dt+ Zt dWt.
This equation is solvable by [17], and, by the maximum principle for mean field game, see Proposition 7, a mean
field equilibrium satisfies αt = Xt − Yt. As observed in the proof of Theorem 5, it holds Yt = V (t,Xt,L(Xt)),
where V corresponds to the derivative of the value function of an infinitesimal player and solves a master equation
analogous to (9) with suitable coefficients. Thus, X satisfies dXt = (Xt − V (t,Xt,L(Xt))) dt + σ dWt. Now,
consider the auxiliary SDE system
dXˆ it = (X
i
t − V (t, Xˆ it , LN(Xˆt))) dt+ σ dW it .
Since V is Lipschitz continuous, it is standard that LN (Xˆt)→ L(Xt) in the weak topology. If LN (Xˆt) and LN(X)
are “sufficiently close” (which in turn can be obtained by the concentration inequalities of Theorems 2 and 18),
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then we can bootstrap well-studied properties of the system Xˆ to make a finer analysis of the convergence of the
Nash equilibrium (αˆ1, . . . , αˆN ) to the mean field equilibrium.
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